


Hold for me

UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO

Anglican Theological Review

JAN 25 1954

PERIODICAL
READING ROOM



EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT

FOUNDED BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

VOLUME XXXVI

JANUARY 1954

NUMBER I

CONTENTS

Editorial	I
The Interpretation of the Christian Faith	3
Communism as a Religion	11
The New Approach to Reunion: A Roman Catholic View of Lund	23
Bultmann and the Mythology of the New Testament	29
Divers Orders in the Ministry	47
Christianity and Psychology	52
Some Liturgical Mistranslations	67
Book Reviews	70
Notes on New Books	77

PUBLISHED BY

THE ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

600 HAVEN STREET
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

UNIVERSITY PRESS
SEWANEE, TENNESSEE

\$1.00 A NUMBER

\$3.50 A YEAR

Anglican Theological Review

VOLUME XXXVI

JANUARY 1954

NUMBER 1

EDITOR: FREDERICK CLIFTON GRANT, Th.D., D.D., D.S.LITT., D.C.L., S.T.D., L.H.D.,
Professor of Biblical Theology, Union Theological Seminary

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR: THE REV. HOLT HUTTON GRAHAM, M.A., S.T.M.,
Assistant Professor of New Testament, Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

SECRETARY AND TREASURER: THE REV. PERCY VARNEY NORWOOD, M.A., Ph.D., S.T.D.,
Professor of Church History, Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

—:—

EDITORIAL BOARD

REV. ARTHUR ADAMS, Ph.D.
RT. REV. DONALD B. ALDRICH, D.D.
RT. REV. STEPHEN F. BAYNE, JR., S.T.D.
REV. FRANCIS WRIGHT BEARE, Ph.D.
REV. J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLEY, D.LITT.
PRES. GORDON KEITH CHALMERS, Ph.D.
RT. REV. WALLACE E. CONKLING, D.D.
RT. REV. ANGUS DUN, D.D.
RT. REV. RICHARD S. M. EMRICH, Ph.D.
REV. CHARLES R. FEILDING, M.A.
REV. ARTHUR HAIRE FORSTER, Ph.D.
REV. ROBERT McQUEEN GRANT, Th.D.
RT. REV. WALTER H. GRAY, D.D.
PROF. LEWIS M. HAMMOND, Ph.D.
REV. EDWARD R. HARDY, JR., Ph.D.
REV. LOUIS A. HASELMAYER, JR., Ph.D.
VERY REV. SHERMAN E. JOHNSON, Ph.D.
VERY REV. ALDEN DREW KELLEY, D.D.
VERY REV. E. FELIX KLOMAN, D.D.
REV. PAUL STEVENS KRAMER, Ph.D.
REV. CHARLES W. LOWRY, JR., Ph.D.
PROF. JOHN S. MARSHALL, Ph.D.
REV. SAMUEL A. B. MERCER, D.D., Ph.D.

REV. RANDOLPH C. MILLER, Ph.D.
REV. ARNOLD S. NASH, D.D.
RT. REV. NORMAN B. NASH, S.T.D.
REV. WILLIAM H. NES, D.D., D.C.L.
REV. PIERSON PARKER, Th.D.
VERY REV. JAMES A. PIKE, J.S.D., J.U.D.
REV. W. NORMAN PITTENGER, S.T.D.
REV. CYRIL C. RICHARDSON, Th.D.
VERY REV. LAWRENCE ROSE, D.D.
REV. OSCAR J. F. SEITZ, Th.D.
REV. MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR., Ph.D.
RT. REV. HENRY KNOX SHERRILL, D.D.
RT. REV. HENRY H. SHIRES, D.D.
REV. CUTHBERT A. SIMPSON, Th.D.
REV. CHARLES W. F. SMITH, D.D.
RT. REV. CHARLES L. STREET, Ph.D.
VERY REV. CHARLES L. TAYLOR, Th.D.
PROF. GEORGE F. THOMAS, Ph.D.
REV. JESSE McL. TROTTER
REV. PERCY L. URBAN, S.T.D.
PROF. JOACHIM WACH, Ph.D.
REV. THEODORE OTTO WEDEL, Ph.D.
REV. ALEXANDER C. ZABRISKIE, S.T.D.

COOPERATING INSTITUTIONS

BERKELEY DIVINITY SCHOOL, New Haven, Connecticut
THE CHURCH CONGRESS OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH
CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC, Berkeley, California
EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, Cambridge, Massachusetts
GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, Chelsea Square, New York City

KENYON COLLEGE, Gambier, Ohio
NASHOTAH HOUSE, Nashotah, Wisconsin
TRINITY COLLEGE, Toronto, Ontario
UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH, Sewanee, Tennessee
PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY IN VIRGINIA, Alexandria, Virginia
SEABURY-WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, Evanston, Illinois

—:—

The REVIEW is published four times a year, as follows: January, April, July, October. Subscription price \$3.50 annually. Single copies, \$1.00.

All editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor, the Rev. Frederick C. Grant, 3041 Broadway, New York 27, New York.

Subscriptions should be sent to the Treasurer, the Rev. Percy V. Norwood, 600 Haven Street, Evanston, Illinois.

Books for review should be sent to the Book Review Editor, the Rev. Holt H. Graham, 600 Haven Street, Evanston, Illinois.

Entered as second-class matter, August 8, 1931, at the post-office at Evanston, Illinois, under the act of March 3, 1879; with additional entry at the post-office at Sewanee, Tennessee.

Anglican Theological Review

FOUNDED IN 1918 BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

EDITED SINCE 1924 BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT

VOLUME XXXVI

JANUARY 1954

NUMBER 1

EDITORIAL

"MAN'S RIGHT TO KNOWLEDGE AND THE FREE USE THEREOF"

Columbia University is observing this year the bicentennial of its foundation, as King's College, in 1754. This REVIEW has a double reason for joining with hosts of other friends, throughout the world, in felicitating the University. One reason is simply a matter of our own history: born and nurtured indeed by the initiative of the University, in large part, the ATR has been privileged to live in the shadow of Morningside and benefit from that warm academic fellowship through many years; and it would be as untrue as ungracious not to acknowledge with gratitude what that history has brought us.

Far more deeply, the theme of this celebration—"Man's Right to Knowledge and the Free Use Thereof" cannot fail to win the hearts and minds of many friends, notably theological friends. Here is stated the liberal proposition, intellectually. This is the assumption, these are the axioms on which not only Morningside but every creative institution in our liberal society is founded. And it is, at heart, a theological proposition.

Man's "right" to knowledge is not an alms from a legislature. Its twin, man's freedom—indeed his obligation—to use what he discovers as he sees best in its light, is not a statutory concession. This right, this freedom, could not survive nor could they even be imagined without a tough and durable assurance as to the nature of Reality itself. Man has a right to knowledge because God in His love wills to be known and to have Nature known. And knowledge brings responsible

freedom with it because it is the nature of man to be free that he may fulfill his creation in the free return of himself and all he has and all he knows to the God from whom he comes.

In easy times, such an assurance can almost be taken for granted. Certainly it was so taken in the founding of King's College. College prospectuses are not usually either literary or intellectual high-water marks; they start where people are and assume what people are currently assuming; and the first prospectus of King's College was no exception. It assumed that young men needed to learn to read and speak, and that they would inescapably proceed from the study of nature to the God of Nature, for it made the prior assumptions both as to nature and the will of God on which the liberal society is constructed.

Those were easier days. In these days of the snarling absolutisms on every side, something more than prejudice is needed to protect the liberal society against itself. To our view, nothing less than the basalt of faith will suffice for the grounding of that defense. Liberal men—scholars and teachers—must not plead for their right to know and to act freely as if that right could be taken away. If the panicky puritanism of fearful people threatens the wide, tolerant freedom in which we were nourished, it will not be withstood by an appeal either to our tradition or our likings. For the liberal tradition itself and its amiable inheritance of liberty is a derivative. It must then be that this courageous theme for the anniversary of a great university will draw many men of good will together, and also draw them into a renewed examination of the rock on which their free way of life is built.

In sum, we would say to our neighbors at Morningside that we gladly take a place at their side in a fresh affirmation of man's right to knowledge and the free use thereof, for that affirmation is a central part of the theological task and mission of our time. God reigns!—therefore no human society can destroy a right and a responsibility He has ordained. We would also say to our brothers in the Church that God reigns, and therefore it is the task and mission of the Church, under the judgment of God, to examine again its own imperative duties toward freedom and truth. For two centuries Columbia has lived out, in the heart of a great city, the intellectual implications of the historic faith of Christians. It is a grave and enheartening privilege for Christians to remember that obligation and their freedom to respond to it with sensitive and determined wills, as comrades in the urgent decisions which confront all civilized men.

S. F. B.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH
THE TENSION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY REPRESENTED IN
"NEO-NATURALISM" AND "NEO-ORTHODOXY"

By ALDEN DREW KELLEY
Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

One of the symptoms of the profound disorder of our times is the break-down of communication between the various intellectual disciplines and between their respective proponents. The sciences speak a language unknown or misunderstood in the humanities; statesmen and politicians are incomprehensible to the industrialist and economist; the sociologist cannot share the concerns of the philosopher; and so on. Nowhere is this chasm of thought and speech so evident as between philosophy and theology.

Historically this is a relatively recent phenomenon in western civilization. All know of the centuries when philosophy was described as the hand-maid of theology and of the more recent period dating from about the 16th century when the tables were turned and theology became increasingly subordinate to and a part of philosophy. In reaction against the domination of religious thought or theology by philosophy, the fashion today is to maintain the autonomy of theology by declaring war on philosophy and all other disciplines of the human reason and to retreat behind the iron curtain of a rigid Biblicism. The end result is identical with that of the logical Positivist who asserts the complete opposition of science, philosophy, etc. to any and all religions and their intellectual articulations which we call theologies.

If this tragic conflict of our day was merely between scientists and philosophers and theologians it would be sufficiently distressing to warrant every effort to overcome the process of intellectual fission. But the confusion is compounded for us because the contradictions are intra-personal and not just interpersonal. All of us share in some way or the other the common mentality of our time, the so-called scientific view of the world. All of us are willy-nilly philosophers in the sense that we operate on a set of assumptions, conscious or unconscious, as to the nature of reality and value. All of us as re-

ligious people appreciate the need for knowledge *about* as well as knowledge *of* God.

Accordingly the tension between philosophy and theology as bases for the interpretation of the Christian faith is not something external to ourselves. We are not talking about the character of the conflict between one group of human beings who are called philosophers and an opposing group denominated theologians. We are describing an interior warfare which, if not arbitrated, will destroy us. To effect an armistice in this area is not to resolve all the problems nor to declare one combatant superior to the other, but rather to make it possible for them to live together in fruitful tension.

As an additional point in this introduction to the discussion, I wish to suggest that the conflict between the claims of philosophy and of theology is not unique to those particular disciplines. The contradictory conclusions and methods appropriate to the various sciences are analogous; or a closer parallel may be found in the relations between the *sciences* and *philosophy*. There is a sense in which the sciences must be independent of philosophical considerations, but in another sense they can never entirely free themselves from a wide range of metaphysical, epistemological, and even ethical assumptions. And, of course, the converse is equally true.

It seems then neither desirable nor even possible to regard the problem of the interpretation of the Christian faith as if it were *sui generis*, something absolutely unrelated to the rest of human experience and knowledge. Nevertheless, for the purposes of immediate consideration, the scope of discussion must be limited. So it will be treated in three aspects only: 1) the validity and necessity of the philosophical method; 2) the basic distinction between philosophy and theology; 3) theology as an autonomous discipline.

I

If there is any single impression to be gained from the study of present day theology of no matter what school, it would be, I believe, the impossibility of communicating the Christian faith much less defending and applying it without the help of philosophy. It may be that certain followers of Barth, Brunner, and others would not be the first cheerfully to admit this conclusion but their presentations inevitably demonstrate it. "Biblical theologians" have many reasons for fearing that philosophy, whether it be Thomistic rationalism or neo-

naturalism, is the camel nose in the tent. Certainly we can never be too much on guard against the norms of philosophy or the concealed and consequently uncriticised assumptions of philosophy being assimilated into or imposed upon theology. The writings of such neo-naturalists as Wieman, Meland, and Williams illustrate well the dangers inherent in the philosophic endeavor.

Many other examples come to mind. Augustine's view of evil as privation of the Good; and his implacable metaphysical dualism of time and eternity. In Thomas Aquinas we find the Aristotelian doctrine of the self-contemplation and self-sufficiency of the Prime Mover. In much classical Reformation thought there are elements of the voluntaristic and nominalistic views of William of Occam and other late Schoolmen. So also with Hegelianism and its theological successors. And, in the theologies of Barth, Brunner, and Bultmann there are discoverable the existentialist categories of our era.

But the answer to this apparently ineradicable tendency of the human mind is not "no philosophy" but "more philosophy". If we think of philosophy, defined by George F. Thomas of Princeton as "the attempt to think clearly, coherently, and comprehensively . . . about the nature of reality," then philosophy is inevitably involved in any theological discussion. Does not the theologian try to tell us what he believes to be important about ultimate reality and value? This cannot be done apart from the general categories of thought in common use by rational human beings. This is to say that he who would talk about or even think about any element of his experience, including the religious, must resort to philosophy.

If no adequate philosophical vehicle for the meaning of religious experience exists, then the theologian must invent one; and frequently he does just that. That is his privilege. But it is not his privilege to try to deceive himself or us by saying that his creation is non-philosophical.

Constructive thinkers in theology are aware of the dangers in philosophy, I believe, and try to avoid some if not most of them. But this is achieved by critical and discriminating use of philosophy, not by its utter rejection. And by "use of philosophy" I would imply that on the whole it is preferable to utilize contemporary language and thought-forms. If we are to interpret and commend the Christian faith to our generation it must be done within a commonly accepted context of meaning.

The broad community of understanding which characterizes our time has been ably delineated by a number of thinkers of the neo-naturalistic school. But its usefulness as an instrument of interpretation of the Christian faith has been only superficially explored. This is not to say that every conclusion of "process philosophers" would be congenial to the Christian theologian any more than would be the conclusions of every economist, sociologist, psychologist, biologist or physicist.

At the least, one can believe that a theology which is expressed in terms of an empiricist rather than a rationalistic or idealistic philosophy appears to be more immediately relevant to the educated mind of our day.

The foregoing statements are more than a hint that for a philosophy to be functionally useful to the Christian theologian it must be characterized by qualities other than contemporaneity alone. From many sources comes the suggestion that a religious philosophy, or at least a Christian philosophy, must be not only empirical but also historical—historical in the sense that it can deal adequately with or leave open the possibility of the unique, the concrete, the singular. This means that its metaphysic is an exercise in the art of analogical thinking and not the mere organization and elaboration of abstract universal concepts.

Whether there is or can be a specifically and recognizably Christian philosophy, or way of philosophizing, it seems certain that the possibility of such will continue to exercise a fascination for the Christian thinker in the future as it has in the past from the earliest days of historic Christianity. Probably we are doomed in this life to approximations and perpetual revisions; but the goal, as distant as it may be and the task as difficult as it may be, will always seem worthwhile.

I would reinforce my main point here by a quotation from *The Christian Understanding of God*, by Nels Ferré. "Reason is always involved in faith. . . . We should not destroy reason for the sake of faith . . . but use reason as critically and creatively as possible. . . . Faith always makes use of some philosophy in so far as this is a matter of consistent thinking true to facts."

II

The basis of conflict between philosophy, even a religious or Christian philosophy, and theology in its systematic or historical form is not too hard to detect. Both disciplines are concerned with the same area, the whole of life. But they approach this common field with a different set of presuppositions and a different attitude.

Philosophy is based on the ideal of inquiry, discovery, search, and criticism. Theology always involves in some way an attitude of givenness or authority, and an acceptance of it. The theologian is a committed man; committed to the object of his worship and thus committed to certain conclusions as to the nature of him whom or that which he worships.

Before proceeding farther it is necessary to indicate what is meant by the word "theology" as I use it here. Although all are familiar with the distinction between "natural" or "philosophical" theology on one hand and "revealed" or "systematic" theology on the other, for the purposes of this discussion I shall mean by "theology" only the latter discipline.

Accordingly it is now possible for us to state that the difference between philosophy, etc. and theology, etc. lies not only in presuppositions but also in approach or method and in conclusions. Paul Tillich has suggested that all philosophies of religion are of two radically differing types. Mostly they depend on what may be called the "cosmological" approach, i.e. they begin with man and his experience of the world of nature about him and argue by inference to some sort of definition or description of ultimate reality. The second type of approach is the "ontological" which begins with some view of the nature of being or reality and proceeds downward, as it were, to interpret the world, man, and his experience by the categories derived from its initial understanding of ultimate reality or value.

In terms of our present problem what Tillich thinks of as two types of philosophy of religion we can designate as philosophy and theology; philosophy being always "cosmological" in its method, and theology representing the "ontological" approach.¹ Christian theology, for example, begins with a given set of premises derived from our knowledge of God as He has revealed Himself in history.

The foregoing distinction seems to be another way of stating Wil-

¹This has nothing to do with the "ontological argument" in its classical forms because the argument is in accordance with this terminology "cosmological" in method.

liam Temple's much quoted "the primary assurances of Religion are the ultimate questions of Philosophy."

Now as to the type of conclusions which are reached by the two disciplines it would appear that the content of philosophy, etc. is to be described as "non-historical", i.e. it is concerned with general propositions, universal judgments, eternal truths, so-called, or the continuous. Theology, as understood here, is in content "historical"; its concern is with the unique, the singular, the discontinuous, "the scandal of particularity". It should be clear then that the tension which exists between philosophy and theology is grounded in no mere verbal difference. In fact it would seem impossible to resolve the disagreement by subordination of one to the other whether the effort be the reduction of theology to a branch of philosophy or the subjugation of philosophy to theology. Nor is there any conceivable "higher category" which can be regarded as the synthesis of the two antithetical elements. The very concept of a "higher category" is philosophical and to subsume theology under such or to regard it as belonging to a genus is to deny, even though in a covert way, the autonomy and distinctive character of theology.

The absolute character of the discontinuity suggested here is not peculiar to the relation between philosophy and psychology. It is discernible in a number of other areas of human experience.

By way of analogy we might consider the two contemporary psychological descriptions of the functioning of human personality. On one hand there is the school of physiological psychologists, behaviorists, who by means of such mechanistic concepts as the "conditioned reflex" explain quite satisfactorily much of human behavior. On the other hand, the psychologists of the analytical school operate with a construct which is non-mechanistic, purposive, in character. Each school of thought presses its key category to the utmost limit with the hope of comprehending the totality of personality.

I imagine that most of us would be inclined to accept the "mechanistic" theory as adequate for the so-called involuntary functioning of the human organism even though we be greatly impressed by recent work in the field of psycho-somatic medicine. At the same time in other areas (I avoid begging the question by refraining from use of the phrase "higher areas") of human personality we are inclined to find more satisfactory those descriptions of human activity which are grounded in the category of "purposiveness". In other words,

each approach seems to be adequate and enlightening for the extreme ends of the spectroscopy of human personality with which each begins in its own way. But what shall we say about the penumbral area in which both psychological theories may seem equally satisfactory and make equally strong claims for having achieved a coherent and comprehensive analysis? Whatever our answer may be, the one thing it cannot be, it seems to me, is that the mechanistic explanation is in some way an aspect of the purposive, or vice versa.

The relevance of this little digression into psychology may not be immediately apparent. But as an analogy it does not seem without merit and more especially in the light of my introductory statement that the tension between philosophy and theology is in great part an inner or psychological drama.

III

Turning our attention now to the question of the autonomy of theology, we cannot but be impressed by the warnings of many of the "Neo-Orthodox" viewpoint. We can well keep in mind the caveat of Pascal, "The God of the philosophers . . . is not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." The existence of God in any religious sense cannot be proved without appealing to our religious experience, or at least to the experience of the living community—the People of God, of which we are a part. We know God directly or we do not know Him at all. However, when we say this we are not to be understood as asserting that we know God only directly. Just as it is impossible to know Him indirectly, i.e. through philosophy, alone so we cannot know God directly alone. We know God both directly and indirectly.

Philosophy cannot begin with presuppositions drawn from any one historical religion but seeks to arrive at conclusions about God and the world from evidence available to all alike. This is important and necessary but it is not dogmatic, systematic, or "revealed" theology. Karl Barth reminds us that for the Christian the validity of any theology ultimately is judged by the Word, not by the principles or norms of philosophy. "The Word judges man, and is not judged by him."

This defines the function of theology even though we cannot accept Barth's rigid exclusion of any use of our rational faculties. "In theology, reason must be free to clarify and elaborate the 'articles of

faith' which are its principles," says George Thomas in *Christianity and Reason*. In fact we can go beyond that and maintain that we must be free to examine and evaluate critically in the light of philosophy and of other aspects of our general experience. If this is not permissible then theology becomes merely the reiteration of its own words and their meaning is entirely subjective. There is no possibility of communication even within the community of the faithful.

The theologian speaks to, for, and within the community. He must go to the core of the revelation of God as set forth in the Scriptures, try to discern the unity beneath a diversity of expression, and state its relevance to the human situation. This the philosopher cannot do; nor can the pure biblicist. William Temple in *Nature, Man and God* (p. 519) presents us with one of his typically succinct summaries: "Natural Theology" (what we have for purposes of this discussion included under the generic term, "Philosophy") "cannot win [man] to worship. It may assure him that there is a God who both claims and deserves his worship; it may bid him to see that God and the way to worship Him; but it cannot confront him with the God whom it describes. It can only discuss God; it cannot reveal Him. . . . Natural Theology, which is indispensable as a source of interpretation and as a purge of superstition even for those who have received a true revelation, . . . if left to itself, ends in a hunger which it cannot satisfy, and yet of which it must perish if no satisfaction is forthcoming."

In every sense it is God only who can lead man to worship and answer the hunger of his soul. Even the theologian cannot do that. But the theologian as a human interpreter and mediator of the meaning of God's revelation can open doors from the inside while the philosopher pounds furiously but vainly at the barred entrance. "Theology is thus both empirical and historical in its method, but always its object is to understand itself, to make those who are religious, in the biblical sense, more and more fully and profoundly conscious of what 'being religious' in the biblical sense, truly means and requires." (J. V. Langmead-Casserly, *The Christian in Philosophy*.)

It is the fashion in religious circles to denounce philosophers as victims of proud and rebellious reason. Similarly the philosopher is prone to indict the theologian of superstition, bigotry, and hypocrisy to the degree that he denies his own philosophical assumptions. Here

we have a supreme example of "the pot calling the kettle black". Both philosophy and theology are the products of finite and sinful reason. The task of theology is never complete and its understanding is always "self-interested"; so, also philosophy.

To conclude, theology is bound up with a particular historic religious tradition from which it derives its authority. Philosophy in a sense is free from the historic tradition although it may operate within the community which embodies the tradition. Its authority is that of the intrinsic cogency of its thought, which is all it needs. Philosophy and theology each has its own specific function indispensable in the human situation; a function not to be confused, divided, nor denied.

The resolution of what Paul Tillich calls "the destructive cleavage" between philosophy and theology is not possible in either philosophical or theological terms. But there is an area of life in which both may operate to the fruitful enrichment of each other; that is within the human soul. Not by "objectification" but in "subjectivity" there is found a practical *modus operandi*. It is in the existential situation that the philosophical approach and the theological approach find their true relationship and fulfillment.

COMMUNISM AS A RELIGION

By H. RALPH HIGGINS

St. Mark's Church
Evanston, Illinois

I. DEFINITIONS

The confident title of this paper declares what many will instantly deny, for it is a commonplace to assume that communism and religion are mutually exclusive. While we shall attempt to show that the condemnation of communism on the ground that it is irreligious is rooted in a misconception, it is certainly true that the subject requires a clear definition of both religion and communism. Unfortunately, neither communism nor religion can be briefly or comprehensively defined, and certainly any definition of either will at once

elicit protests from those who favor other definitions. This, however, is a disadvantage we must accept if not approve. So far as each term is concerned we must live with the fact that there is no official definition of such clarity and unambiguity that will leave all minds satisfied. With this necessary warning we will do the best we can, for, patently, unless we know what it is we are comparing our remarks may quicken the fire and thicken the smoke but will increase little the illumination so obviously needed in these critical days.

Definitions of religion are legion and most of them are faulty because they emphasize one element at the expense of others. Much of the difficulty proceeds from the fact that religion, of necessity, is concerned with ultimates and intangibles subjectively evaluated. The Bible itself offers many and often partial definitions. Religious literature abounds in all sorts of definitions, stressing variously the ethical, psychological, liturgical, philosophical, institutional, dogmatic and cultural components. For the purposes of this paper we shall assume that religion is the area of man's personal and group relatedness to that which he regards as of final reality and ultimate worth.

Although a recognition of historical development is essential to the purpose even so it is difficult to define communism, for some appeal to Marx, others to Engels, Lenin, or Stalin, and still others to any one of the numerous official pronouncements of the communist party. It is very much like trying to find a definition of Christianity—so much depends on what one is willing to accept in evidence. With these reservations in mind it may be said that communism envisions the social ownership of some or all consumers goods as well as the social ownership of the means of economic production.

The term communism was given common currency around 1840 by the secret revolutionary societies of Paris, and the revolutionary connotation springs from historical circumstance. Communism as a doctrine became linked to violence when, about the middle of the nineteenth century, there first emerged the proposition that socialism could be established only after the forcible overthrow of capitalist society. It was during this period that socialism and communism became differentiated, not only on the basis of the difference in objectives—already mentioned—but also on the basis of difference in methods. Socialism now restricted itself generally to calling for the achievement of its aims through peaceful and constructive change. From about 1870 to the outbreak of the first World War it became

increasingly common to blur the distinctions and to use communism and socialism as interchangeable terms—a popular cause of confusion to this day. However, after the Russian revolution of 1917 the original distinctions tended to be reinstated.

Whether or not the definition suggested be considered adequate, it is abundantly evident that communism as a system is a product of faith and that its practical aims are as closely related to religion, as defined above, as they are to economics and politics. With this consideration in mind we may proceed to some examination of the basic doctrines of Marxian communism.

II. COMMUNIST DOCTRINES

Religions are noted for their preoccupation with doctrine. Communism shares this interest. Although critics of communism have pointed out that communism views reality from far too restricted a vantage point, advocates of Marxism reply that since their system is based on a scientifically true insight into the grounds of ultimate reality they can well sacrifice comprehensiveness for fundamental orientation.

Basic communist doctrine can be considered as falling within three major divisions: (1) respecting the nature of reality, (2) respecting historical materialism, (3) respecting the drama of redemption.

1. *Respecting the nature of reality.*—The most evident reality in the universe is nature, and nature's laws or modes of operation are rational. Behind nature is matter. That Marxism is an expression of the traditional *jus naturale* is obvious. This fundamental communist doctrine cannot be proved any more than the basic doctrine of its counterpart in idealism can be proved. Communists make no attempt to prove their doctrine; they dogmatically assert it and thus confess, in effect, that their entire system is erected upon an act of faith.

2. *Respecting historical materialism.*—Had Karl Marx been content to preach a specific variety of naturalism, in all probability his system would have but slightly influenced mankind. Marx, however, was an inspired man and his genius demonstrated itself when he effected a confluence of the doctrine of naturalism and the stream of history. Communism reveals the insight that history is not a mere concatenation of events. The dynamic forces underlying human life are not

the Idea or ideas of idealism but the economically productive apparatus and techniques of social man.

From these fundamental principles it is evident that economic determinism emerges as the dynamic force of history. In a letter to a student, written in 1890, Engels confessed: "Marx and I are partly responsible for the fact that the younger men have sometimes laid more stress on the economic side than it deserves. In meeting attacks of our opponents it was necessary for us to emphasize the dominant principle denied by them and we did not always have the time, place, or the opportunity, to let the other factors which were concerned with the actual action and reactions get their deserts."

Theoretically, communist doctrine is not so much the doctrine of economic determinism as of economic interpretation. In practice, however, the dominance of economics is assured for it is the economic relations of people that really determine the type of society. In *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (p. 11), Marx wrote: "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life."

It is important to realize that communism as a doctrine is an expression of historical materialism but not of philosophical materialism. Philosophical materialism is rooted in the concept that the universe is composed of material elements. Communism is not concerned with these ultimate elements but rather seeks to explain the facts of social evolution; thus it is that "social, political, and intellectual relations, all religious and legal systems, all theological outlooks which emerge in the course of history . . . are derived from the material conditions of life" (Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 93).

Marx concluded that communism is the goal of the economic pre-occupation of history because he noted that production is always a collective process. Probably Marx's greatest contribution to social understanding was his recognition and demonstration of the fundamental significance of economics in history and culture.

Once the basic doctrine had been isolated it was not difficult to conclude that the economically dominant class in society always determines the form of the state and controls its operations. "The state is an executive committee for administering the affairs of the governing class as a whole."

The conflict between capitalism and communism is the final struggle because it represents in ultimate form the basic economic issues

before the human race. Since in the past the state has existed for the benefit of the economically dominant group it will disappear when communism finally triumphs: "The machine of the state is put into the museum of antiquities, alongside of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe" (Engels). Here again we note that communism is rooted in dynamic faith rather than in the scientific evaluation of objective data. In any event the historical materialism of communism, unlike philosophical materialism, is not necessarily incompatible with all forms of idealistic religion.

3. *Respecting the drama of redemption.*—Communism is not content to present an explanation of the nature of reality and to set down what it conceives to be the dynamics of history. Communist doctrine also reveals a goal of history which is presented in terms of a drama of redemption. There are a number of principal elements in this drama.

(a) *The dialectic.*—Communist dialectic is, in effect, a distortion of the Hegelian doctrine of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Philosophically conceived, the dialectic represents the application of the laws of motion to social evolution. Politically conceived, the dynamics of the dialectic is revolution and it is for this reason that revolution is regarded as the inevitable working out of the dialectic. The dialectic produces progress through the conflict of opposites, from which conflict a synthesis emerges; this synthesis in turn becomes the first stage in a new application of the dialectic and thus assures movement toward the ultimate goal of history.

(b) *The evil of capitalism.*—In the modern stage of the conflict, the dialectic is expressed in its warfare against capitalism. Lenin gave practical political expression to Engels' teaching that the proletariat could secure the overthrow of capitalism only through the application of violent revolution.

The root of all evil is private property which lies at the heart of class distinction. Once capitalism has been eliminated private property will likewise be eliminated and the cause of evil rooted out forever. Private property is evil because it enslaves men to the economic institutions from which property derives its significance.

(c) *The triumph of the proletariat.*—Because the dialectic is true it is inevitable that the proletariat will eventually triumph. Nevertheless, the members of the proletariat must themselves aid in the unfolding of the dialectical struggle. The class struggle is the means

whereby society develops. (There are some interesting implications here for the continuing controversy over the freedom of the human will.)

(d) *Sin, repentance, and conversion.*—Since private property is the root of all evil, sin consists of a stubborn opposition to the movement of the dialectic. Salvation can come only by repentance and the rejection of everything which hinders the triumph of world communism.

(e) *The millennium.*—With the triumph of the proletariat and the elimination of capitalism the class struggle will be no more, the state will wither away because there will be no need for the functions of the state, and the result will be an everlastingly just human society.

The religious implications of fundamental communist doctrines can be illustrated by embodying them in creedal form:

I believe in Matter, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible;

And in one Nature, the only begotten of Matter, being of one substance with Matter;

I believe in the Dialectic, the Lord and Giver of Life, which proceedeth from Matter through Nature, which with Matter and Nature is worshiped and glorified, which spake by Marx and the communist prophets;

And I believe one Communist Party: I acknowledge the evils of capitalism and the sins of private property: I believe in the class struggle through which redemption shall come; in the communion of the proletariat, and in the withering away of the state: and I look for the life everlasting of a triumphant world communist society.

III. RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNISM

Despite the religious evidences implicit within basic communist doctrine, the mere suggestion that communism has any religious implications is sufficient to cause many good citizens to recoil in horror. They point with indignation to the materialism, brutality, cynicism, ethical inversion, and political tyranny of contemporary communism and ask how it can be possible for anyone in his right mind to speak of religion and communism in the same breath. And if the behavior of the communists in the international household is not sufficient to demonstrate their complete lack of association with religion of any sort, there are the frequent atheistic and anti-religious tirades of the

communist hierarchy to which to point. Nevertheless, a thoughtful reading of communist literature and sober reflection upon communist activity reveal the deeply religious basis of the whole movement. It is always important to realize that doctrine and its practical expressions, religion and the behavior of religious people, creeds and conduct, may and often do present basic contradictions. It must also be borne in mind that Russian communism, like all human movements, varies greatly from time to time; indeed, frequent changes in the party line demonstrate this fact.

It is certain that Marx rejected all forms of organized religion and it is equally true that communism has been bitterly antagonistic to Christianity. Nevertheless, the violence of communist anti-religious feeling is a significant revelation of communism's basically religious sentiments. A truly nonreligious movement would not have betrayed the irrational and highly emotional attitude toward organized religion which from the beginning has characterized the history of Soviet communism. One of the most penetrating insights into the religious significance of communism was that revealed by Christopher Dawson in *Religion and the Modern State* (pp. 87f):*

"Karl Marx was of the seed of the prophets, in spite of his contempt for anything that savored of mysticism or religious idealism. . . . The Messianic hope, the belief in the coming destruction of the Gentile power and the deliverance of Israel were to the Jew not mere echoes of Biblical tradition; they were burnt into the very fibre of his being by centuries of thwarted social impulse in the squalid Ghettoes of Germany and Poland. And in the same way the social dualism between the elect and the reprobate, between the people of God and the Gentile world-power, was a fact of bitter personal experience of which even the most insensitive was made conscious, in the hundred petty annoyances of Ghetto life. . . .

"Now the Revolution and the coming of Liberalism had put an end to this state of things. . . . But (Marx) could not deny his Jewish heredity and his Jewish spirit . . . the only way of escape that remained open to him was by the revolutionary tradition, which was then at the height of its prestige and popularity. In this he found satisfaction at once for his conscious hostility to bourgeois civilization and for the deeper revolt of his repressed religious instincts.

"The three fundamental elements in the Jewish historical attitude—the opposition between the chosen people and the Gen-

*Quoted by permission of the publishers, Sheed and Ward, New York.

tile world, the inexorable Divine judgment on the latter, and the restoration of the former in the Messianic kingdom—all found their corresponding principles in the revolutionary faith of Karl Marx. Thus the bourgeois took the place of the Gentiles, and the economic poor took the place of the spiritual poor of the Old Testament . . . while the Messianic kingdom finds an obvious parallel in the dictatorship of the proletariat which will reign until it has put down all rule and authority and power and in the end will deliver up its kingdom to the classless and stateless society of the future which will be all in all."

There seem to be three basically religious postulates of communism:

1. *That reality is essentially good.*—Communism subordinates ideas to things, which is a logical outgrowth of the basic communist premise that the universe is ultimately material. Nevertheless, the intention of the universe—if matter can be said to have intention—is good, otherwise the entire communist program would be irrational and unattainable. The evil which is in the universe is in the imperfect and noncommunist economic systems hitherto evolved by man. Once the communist philosophy and program are adopted evil will disappear.

2. *That the achievement of perfection is inevitable.*—Despite the injustice and suffering in human society, history is moving inevitably toward the realization of the perfectly just and righteous social order.

3. *That the supreme virtue is faith.*—It is quite evident that the foregoing postulates are themselves mighty acts of faith. The supremacy of faith in the communist philosophy and program is revealed equally in the overriding insistence upon unwavering adherence to each and every official dogma, irrespective of its moral or intellectual validity, and in the correlative demands for absolute loyalty and obedience.

The religious implications of communism are even more definitely revealed in some of the specific teachings. We have already referred to the fundamental doctrines of communism respecting the nature of reality, the economic determination of history, and the drama of redemption. It will be worthwhile now to call attention very briefly to certain other religious parallelisms in the teachings.

1. *The dialectic and the Holy Spirit.*—According to Marx, history reveals the ceaseless working of the dialectic, which instantly suggests the comparable activity of the Holy Spirit as conceived by the Christian system. At least one important activity of the Holy Spirit

is to seek to draw men to a knowledge of God and acceptance of his grace. It is part of the function of the dialectic to move men to accept the ultimate nature of reality and to embrace and ever hold fast to the strengthening power then made available through communist insight.

2. *The classless society and the kingdom of God.*—One of the most potent elements in communism is its preaching of the coming millenium which will be characterized by the withering away of the state and the establishment of a truly communist classless society. This vision has obvious analogies to the Christian concept of the Kingdom of God.

3. *The remnant and the communion of saints.*—Marxism seeks the transformation of human society from an aggregation of individuals unconscious or semi-conscious of social integration into a social whole in which the individual's consciousness extends to the periphery of society itself. This transformation will be made possible by the witness of the faithful proletariat, which group is strongly reminiscent of the remnant of Old Testament prophecy.

4. *World revolution and apocalyptic.*—A close comparison can be drawn between communist teaching relative to the long series of revolutions culminating in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the Christian concept of the ultimate overthrow of Satan and his angels.

5. *Heaven and final perfection.*—The communist heaven is the final, inevitable, just, righteous, stateless, classless social order from which evil will have been banished through the elimination of all who, either through blind ignorance or willful stubbornness, have refused communist salvation.

6. *Deviationism, inertia, and sin.*—Although we have already treated briefly of the communist drama of redemption, it should be pointed out here that sin plays a significant role in communism. Sin is essentially the rejection of the dialectic which, like the sin against the Holy Ghost, is the one unforgivable sin. While, then, the individual's rejection of the dialectic is the essence of sin, private property is the social expression of that sin. The widespread inertia and indifference to the communist plan of salvation is an evidence of original sin. Like Christianity, communism declares that it is the sin and not the sinner that must be condemned, although to date communism has failed signally to observe its own teaching in this regard, as a long list of public purges and private liquidations testifies.

Since it is fundamental to all religions that there must be some way to deal with sin, communism provides a way of salvation which parallels in some respects the Christian technique: the sinner must repent, i.e. he must turn away from the bourgeois mentality and accept the revelation offered in communism. This repentance leads to a radical conversion. Mere reformation is not sufficient for the reason that reformation simply covers the sin and does not root it out. It is significant to note that communism is more violently opposed to liberalism and reform movements than to anything else—organized religion included. It should be said here, parenthetically, that one of the surest ways to give aid and comfort to Soviet communism is to destroy liberalism. Unfortunately, there are many present evidences that the western world, and America in particular, may be in grave danger of doing this very thing.

Although communism believes in sin and repentance, it has no place for forgiveness. If one truly repents and is radically converted there is no need to forgive, and if one is not repentant and radically converted he is to be liquidated and so placed beyond the operational sphere of forgiveness.

7. *The new life.*—One of the strongest features of communism is its call to a new life. The appeal of this aspect of communism, particularly to the oppressed peoples of the world, is incalculable. This new life which follows upon the heels of repentance, radical conversion, and acceptance of the grace of the dialectic, is no life of sweetness and light. It is a rigorous, well disciplined experience calling for complete personal and social commitment, and continual sacrifice—not only of self but of everything, including the truth—that the maintenance and propagation of the faith may be assured. Moreover the disciple must become a missionary filled with evangelical zeal, working day and night, in season and out of season, for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship through world revolution. As Nehru has commented: "The communists have replaced the fervor of old fashioned religion with the fervor of their new creed."

8. *Religio-social implications.*—Specifically social implications of communist religion involve certain ideals which always make a strong appeal to religious sentiment. One of these is supra-nationalism. Religion at its best can never live comfortably within the confines of nationalistic restrictions. Then, too, communism has always emphasized the social virtues of order, community, and justice, all of which

are prominent features of all the great religions, and especially of Christianity. Even freedom is stressed in the communist religion but freedom here means acceptance of the inevitable, objective, and comprehensive control of nature.

The social appeal of communism was well stated several years ago by Arthur Bryant in the London *Sunday Times* where, in telling about the reactions of British soldiers during World War II, he wrote: "What appeals to them about Russia—and quite a number to whom I have lectured have been there—is not Communism, or its institutions, but the fact that the Russian people apparently feel themselves engaged in a crusade not only against the Nazi but against the more enduring enemies of mankind—want, disease, spiritual blindness, loneliness."

9. *Ecclesiastical and institutional implications.*—In order to survive, a religion must become institutionalized. Communism exhibits some of the classic religious institutional expressions. Religions generally produce sacred writings and churches. The sacred writings of communism—principally the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin—are well known and are appealed to with all the fervor and uncritical optimism of religious devotees. The church of communism is the party, which determines strategy and policy, enunciates dogma, and enforces discipline. The party line is the gospel modified and adapted to meet the needs of the moment. There is a type of apostolic succession, for Marx may properly be thought of as having ordained Engels and they together as having ordained Lenin. Lenin ordained Stalin and Stalin presumably ordained Malenkov. That the succession was probably accomplished by the laying on of violent hands on many, that the actual transmission of authority was secured in a manner contrary to the intent and will of the consecrator, or that there is complete absence of any clearly authenticated act of formal succession would not in any degree alter this communist fact. An interesting speculation at the moment is concerned with the possibility that the top leadership of communism may soon be vested not in one man but in some type of bureaucratic administration. Should this change eventuate there is no doubt that the apostolic succession would still be claimed in fact if not in theory.

The initiatory rites of communism are as rigid as those of any religion and admission to formal membership in the church, i.e. the party, comes only after prolonged and careful indoctrination and the

submission of evidences of soundness in the faith. The various types of gatherings, many of them secret, with their attendant rites and rigidly structured discussions, provide activities which at least in some respects fulfill the basic requirements of a sacramental system. An inverted form of exorcism can be detected in the use of narcotic and psychological methods whereby accused persons of prominence are induced to confess and recant their alleged heresies and crimes before public tribunals.

10. *Ethical implications.*—One of the things about communism that troubles people of good will is its ethical cynicism. This very cynicism, however, is a product of a sort of religious thinking. Faith is supreme, and all behavior is to be judged in accordance with the inherent demands of the faith. Once this ethical dualism is realized, Stalin's dictum can be understood: "Words must have no relation to action. Otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron."

To put it in another way, the application of the dialectic to conduct is the substance of communist ethics. Right and wrong are to be determined solely by the relation of any act to the demands of the communist ideology and program. For this reason communists can lie, cheat, steal, and murder without moral compunction. In other words, ethical conduct is simply that behavior which at any given time serves the purposes of the dialectic in reference to its goals. That ethical dualism is no fatal bar to a religion of sorts is amply attested by the history of such religious movements as Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism. In this connection it is provocatively interesting to observe that in doctrine communism is monist—as its insistence upon the unity of theory and practice clearly reveals—and dualist in ethics. ●

IV. SUMMARY

It is evident that whatever else communism may be it does meet the basic requirements of a religion. For this reason world communism cannot be either adequately or effectively dealt with on political, economic, or military grounds alone. The threat of world communism can be successfully met only when its basic religious appeal is neutralized. For this reason it will not do to combat communism on the ground that it is a materialistic philosophy; after all,

western capitalism has demonstrated that it, too, is essentially materialistic both in theory and in practice. Communism will be liquidated only by the sincere adoption of a religious philosophy which makes sense as an interpretation of universal reality and also guarantees the achievement of those human rights and dignities which mankind generally holds to be part of its inherent right. Christians are convinced that their theology and world view meet these specifications; all that is required is that these principles shall manifest themselves in terms of a just and righteous society.

THE NEW APPROACH TO REUNION

A ROMAN CATHOLIC VIEW OF LUND

By SAMUEL J. T. MILLER

Boston College

In recent times Christian groups have taken to speaking to each other in at least two significant ways. In the first instance notable rapprochements have been made between Catholics, Protestants, and the Orthodox, and in the second, Protestants and the Orthodox have shown an admirable tendency, not only to speak to each other, but to speak together in religious *colloquia* that show a marked trend toward emphasizing the *Una Sancta* and to consider its visible establishment their Christian obligation.

On the part of the Catholics the present reigning Pontiff has taken the lead in friendly approaches. His encyclicals persistently appeal to a much larger group than those visibly and formally under Roman Obedience. To cite but one example, in the celebrated pastoral brief *Humani Generis* (August 12, 1950) he urged "men of good will" to join forces in opposition to the contemporary directions of society toward disunity and profound aberrations from the truth.

Much literature devoted to the results of communication and discussion between Protestants and Catholics is appearing. Probably the most notable event along this line is the reappearance of *Catholica*, a German periodical published at Münster, for presenting the latest developments in what the Germans call *Kontroverstheologie*. *Catholica* is edited by the eminent Doctor Grosche of Cologne (Gereonskloster).

The periodical appears with the approval of ecclesiastical authority. It abjures false irenicism but appeals to all men to engage in theological colloquies which are "the recognized way that can bring us nearer to the unity of the Church" (*Catholica*, IV. 1, March 1952, p. 3).

Catholica takes the position that philosophy and theology cannot leave the world to its own devices. A true irenicism forces any theology or philosophy which deserves the name of Catholic to leave its comfortable house and go out into the world. "It is not enough to teach Saint Thomas; he must be taught in such a way that he does not forever disgust his hearers." Clearly *Catholica* and its contributors do not mean that tradition should be abandoned but rather that it is not satisfactory simply to hold fast, for the *depositum fidei* is a living thing. (*Catholica*, ib., p. 42.)

Now this is a daring and vital approach and one which is widely held among important European ecclesiastics who have been battered and knocked about by one terrible calamity after another. It is an attitude which repudiates integralism (a death grip on non-essentials as well as the *depositum fidei*), which brings the Catholic faith into its proper historical perspective and which shows that every last detail of modern Catholic practice is not a matter of faith or dogma. It is an attitude which is willing to experiment within the wide limits permitted in the Church and which repudiates charitably but firmly the complacency and self-satisfaction of the pharisee and the synagogue which latter constitutes a state of mind most dangerous to the health of the Church, for the Church is not an *objet d'art* or an Olympic cult; it is a living force that can never be in a state of rest simply because it is the *vital* extension of Christ's Body on earth.

Happily this same daring and vital state of mind is represented among the Protestants. It is strikingly brought to our attention by the work of the World Council of Churches, the chief Protestant ecumenical organization in Europe and America. The irenic work of the WCC is, like its Catholic ideological counterpart, most audacious but also highly charitable. The general attitude of the WCC representatives is a prayerful one that leaves the principal work of church reunion to God and refuses to take rash steps which, although seeming in principle to hasten the establishment of the *Una Sancta*, merely violate consciences and construct flimsy structures which go down before the search for truth.

This praiseworthy current of thought among the Protestants is best typified by the spirit of the *Report* from the Third World Conference

on Faith and Order, held at Lund, Sweden, in August of 1952. Catholics may well imitate the general method and tenor of this *Report*. It breathes forth a spirit whose zeal and ardent charity should be a living reproach to those who sit blandly in the charmed circle of any well established, wealthy, powerful church and counter every questioning of their faith with trick answers or the assumption that they possess absolute truth in every particular.

The Conference at Lund, the subject of the *Report*, was held under the general auspices of the WCC and had representatives from all the major Protestant confessional churches, from the Orthodox church, from the American free churches, and in their midst, for the first time, appeared four observers accredited by the Apostolic See who listened to the deliberations, made contributions to them and heard the Lutheran Archbishop of Upsala style their appearance under such circumstances as a "meaningful sign." Representatives from the Russian dominated countries, not many, but a few, spoke along with the delegates from the western countries. Notable in this respect was the declaration of Josef Hromadka, Dean of the Comenius Faculty of Theology in Prague, who said, "The Church must remove—under the guidance of the Holy Spirit—all her idols and false altars. She must struggle with the Antichrist in her own sanctuary and not look for devils where they are nothing more than creations of fear and our human phantasy." (*British Weekly*, Sept. 25, 1952.)

The *Report* itself (*Faith and Order*, SCM Press, London, Nov. 1952) opens with a humble confession of failure in a certain sense. It is admitted that advance toward church unity cannot be made if "we only compare our several conceptions of the nature of the Church and the traditions in which they are embodied" (p. 5). Self-judgment is urged strongly upon the delegates. "Penitence has been often on our lips here at Lund. Penitence involves willingness to endure judgment—the judgment of the Lord to whom has been given the power to sift mankind and to gather into one the scattered children of God. We await His final judgment at the end of history. But, in God's mercy, tokens of judgment which are also calls to a new and active obedience come to us in our days also, here and now. Surely we cannot any longer remain blind to the signs of our times and deaf to His Word" (p. 6).

Chapter II of the *Report* deals with Christ and His Church. A unity of spirit is proclaimed. "Wheresoever men are met in obedience to Him, He is known. He may be found in the midst of those from whom we

are separated and in the midst of those to whom we are sent" (p. 10). It is suggested that all can defer in some things to the judgment of others. Those who believe they possess the true order and sacraments "will find themselves called to give a rightful place to the Living Word. Some who have neglected the sacraments will be confronted by Him who humbled Himself in Baptism and broke bread and shared the cup to make us partakers of His passion and death. Those who have sought to show forth the glory of the Church as the Body and Bride of Christ must stand under the judgment of His simplicity and servanthood. Churches which have valued little His prayer that the oneness of His people be made manifest to men will be summoned to make His prayer their own. Churches complacent in the face of racial divisions in the Body will be brought to repentance by Him in whom bond and free, Jew and Gentile, Greek and barbarian, are one. Churches which have stressed one-sidedly that God in His Church gives Himself to men will be reminded that Christ in His humanity offered Himself to the Father. Those who are ever looking backward and have accumulated much precious ecclesiastical baggage will perhaps be shown that pilgrims must travel light and that, if we are to share at last in the great Supper, we must let go much that we treasure. Churches settled and self-assured will have to hear again the Lord's heart-broken concern for the sheep without a shepherd and know that to be His Church is to share in His world-embracing mission. Churches too much at home in the world will hear themselves called out of the world. Churches too wrapped up in their own piety or their own survival will see again Him who identified Himself with the deprived and the oppressed" (pp. 10-11).

Continuity and Unity constitute the next chapter of the *Report*. It is declared that the Church witnesses to Jesus Christ in its worship, its order and its life. This is a significant statement, for it approaches the Catholic concept or God-Church-man view of the Church rather than the sixteenth century revolution of God-man-Church. According to the *Report*, there is, despite division, a unity given by God in Christ, and this unity must be seen in one church, and that a *visible* one. Unfortunately there is no general agreement on what is the essence of the Church, that is, whether certain doctrinal, sacramental, and ministerial forms constitute this essence. It is recommended that "non-theological factors of denominationalism" and traditions based on political, national, and social foundations should be studied with humility and penance in mind and be finally put away as divisive subjects. It is urged

that Christians profit from each other's characteristic habits and methods and not reject what may be profitable because it belongs to another tradition. In summary of this section, the statement affirms the essential matter of visibility of the *Una Sancta* as composed of elements belonging to this world of space and time: "The nature of the unity towards which we are striving is that of a visible fellowship in which all members, acknowledging Jesus Christ as living Lord and Saviour, shall recognize each other as belonging fully to His Body, to the end that the whole world may believe" (p. 25).

In the fourth division, the thorny problem of "ways of worship" is attacked—not frontally to be sure but encouragingly. A suggestion is made that might sound a note of warning to Catholics who race through their beads and think of everything under the sun except the prayer content represented by the beads. The suggestion is this: the task of the Church is "to use liturgical prayer as a means of disciplining the private prayer of the individual, and enlarging the scope of his intercession; while the private prayer of the individual, in its turn, quickens the liturgical life and purges it from the taint of formalism" (p. 29). In this section on worship, however, the tragic divisions within Protestantism are stated very clearly and it is in this area that the greatest divergence seems to lie. It is the familiar difference between the "catholic" and "protestant" parties within the Protestant communions. From the tone of the *Report* on this subject it would seem that reunion lies in the very remote future on such subjects as the character of the eucharistic sacrifice, the proper ordering of ministers, and the sacraments as objective rather than subjective things.

The body of the *Report* comes to an end with a consideration of Intercommunion. In many ways this is the most poignant part of the entire *Report*, and Catholics should not feel pharisaical contentment but genuine sympathy when their Protestant brothers declare, "We are painfully aware that as long as we remain divided at the Lord's Table we cannot fully enjoy and express the unity which has been given us in Christ" (p. 37). However, premature reunion without proper understanding of the eucharistic sacrifice on the part of all concerned is to be avoided. All union must find "its basis in the teaching of Scripture and be tested by conformity to the Word of God" (p. 37). Intercommunion where possible is urged and a complete and prayerful study of future possibilities for intercommunion is strongly recommended.

Where do we stand? With these words the *Report* closes. Serious

consideration of the following concepts is suggested: (1) The Church lives "by the final revelation of God in Jesus Christ at a particular point in history . . . , but [and this seems to be of profound significance] it is within the continuous movement of history that it bears witness to this Gospel and applies it to human need." (2) The understanding of the Scriptures to which the Reformers made their primary appeal has greatly advanced and it is urged that the churches, by mutual and cooperative study, investigate these new forms of Biblical interpretation and try to see if their old relationships are thereby altered in any way. (3) It is stated that factors of separation of the churches should be studied in the light of the possible cultural, social, political, and economic circumstances that divide them, and that divisions based on ephemeral causes should be healed in the light of truth. (4) The churches are called upon to witness for Christ in an age of persecution and human misery. "The Church in our time is experiencing anew the sense of crisis and urgency that marked the Apostolic Age" (p. 49), and it is in this sense of pressing need that Christians are exhorted to fling themselves upon the wellspring of Grace and find therein a new sense of unity.

Now it is true that none of these movements, ecumenical or irenical, on the part of Catholics or Protestants may lead to reunion within our time. The separation goes too deeply to be healed by a nostrum or by the wills of a handful of devoted men of good will. Moreover, as in the Lund Report, let it be remarked that God will play the principal role in reunion, if and when it does occur. The efforts of men can never be more than pitiful in contrast to God's fiat, but God has endowed us with a will; it is His wish that we use it for good. Even if it is only to pray quietly and privately, let us beseech God to increase the signs of reunion and bring it about in the fullness of time. For those who can act and write for reunion let them do so but let them approach the matter in the spirit of penance. Although they know the truth in many things and know that they know it by revelation and authority, we pray that they face the question as did Saint Augustine before them when he said, "One must not count among the heretics those who without stubborn anger defend their doctrine, even if it be false and perverse, above all if they are not themselves the authors of it, having received it from their parents already seduced and fallen into error, if they seek truth with prudent solicitude, ready to embrace it once they have found it" (Epistle 162, *P.L.*, vol. 33 col. 160).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A short bibliography of works devoted to irenicism, either directly or indirectly, would include:

Jacques Bivort de la Saudé, *Documents sur le Problème de l'Union Anglo-Romaine* (1921-1927), (Paris, 1949).

Charles Boyer, S. J., *One Shepherd* (New York, 1952).

H. R. T. Brandreth, *Unity and Religion* (London, 1948). The best possible general bibliography on the problem of church reunion.

Yves Congar, O. P., *Jalons pour une Théologie du Laïcat* (Paris, 1953).

Yves Congar, O. P., *La vraie et fausse Réforme dans l'Eglise* (Paris, 1950).

Maurice Nédoncelle, *Le Problème Anglo-catholique au XVII^e Siècle* (Paris, 1951).

J. V. M. Pollet, O. P., "L'Anglicanisme libéral et le Mouvement oecuménique", *Ottawa University Review*, special section, July-Sept., 1947, pp. 133-168.

For current bibliography one might consult the journals *Irenikon* published by the Benedictines at Chevtonne, *Unity*, and the publication of the American Vernacular Society, *Amen*.

BULTMANN AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

By SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

Berkeley, California

Rudolf Bultmann, recently retired from a distinguished career as professor of New Testament in the University of Marburg, is one of the most controversial figures in the European theological world. In English-speaking countries he has been known until recently as the most radical exponent of form-criticism; in this he has been greatly admired, sometimes combatted, but seldom followed.¹ Outside Germany the influence of Martin Dibelius has been comparatively much greater. On the continent of Europe, however, Bultmann has been a significant biblical theologian, and his proposal for "the demythologizing of the New Testament" has stirred up far more of a storm than his criticism of the gospels ever evoked.

It is just as bitter a controversy as might arise in Anglicanism if a distinguished theologian seriously proposed that a revised and modernized creed should be printed in the Prayer Book. For while cultus and the episcopate are the great Anglican interests, theology—and particularly biblical theology—is central in continental Protestant thought. And while the debate is characteristically European and

¹R. Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition*, 2nd ed. (Göttingen, 1931); F. C. Grant, ed., *Form Criticism* (Chicago, 1934), Part I.

German in form, it raises questions which are ecumenical in scope, and it is instructive for British and American theology, much of which simply ignores the revived biblicism of Europe and the fundamentalists at home. The volume which started the discussion has not been translated, but it has been reviewed extensively, and good summaries are available in English.² The English reader now has access also to most of Bultmann's treatise on New Testament theology and thus is in a position to see how he handles some of his material.³

I

Bultmann is important—and either helpful or dangerous or both—because he is not a specialist in an ivory tower content to add footnote to footnote, but a theologian deeply concerned for the Christian life of Europe and the understanding and acceptance of the gospel message. His concern, like that of Karl Barth and the crisis theologians, has been heightened by the tragedy of the two world wars, the increasing secularization of life, the rise of Nazism, paganism, and nihilism, and the waning influence of the Church and Christianity. He and his followers find it necessary to speak in terms understandable by young men and women who have passed through these shattering crises and whose intellectual life has been formed entirely by the modern scientific world-view.

Furthermore, Bultmann is not a liberal; at least not in the older meaning of the word. His gospel criticism and his analysis of New Testament ideas are more radical than those of his predecessors. He finds in the gospels a much smaller nucleus of "genuine" sayings of Jesus and stories about him than did Harnack, Johannes Weiss, or Dibelius. New Testament faith must therefore, for him, rest on a different basis. The theological ideas of the New Testament have, moreover, been cast in the mythological forms which were ready to

²H. W. Bartsch, ed., *Kerygma und Mythos* (Hamburg, 1948). The second edition (Hamburg, 1951 52) includes a second volume containing further discussions by various scholars, and Bultmann's rebuttal of criticisms. References in footnotes are to this second edition. See the review of the original book by A. N. Wilder, "Mythology and the New Testament," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXIX (1950), 113-27; cf. also K. Grobel, *JBL*, LXX (1951), 99-103; J. H. Otwell, "Neo-Orthodoxy and Biblical Research," *Harvard Theological Review*, XLIII (1950), 145-57; S. E. Johnson, "Two Great New Testament Interpreters," *Religion in Life*, XXI (1952), 288-97; Ian Henderson, *Myth in the New Testament* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 7, London, 1952).

³R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (New York, 1951), especially pp. 4-II, 239-53, 299-303, 322-33.

hand in the Judaism and paganism of the first century; and here Bultmann has gone a long way with the history of religion school whose work Harnack rejected so decisively.⁴ Instead of minimizing these difficulties, Bultmann sharpens them. On the other hand, he is a reformation theologian and, specifically, a Lutheran. The gospel, particularly as understood by St. Paul, is essential to Christianity; not the good news of Jesus, which has its place in the picture but does not contain all the elements and is open to so much question, but rather the full gospel of salvation through faith in him and in the event which wrought man's salvation. Like the crisis theologians, Bultmann rejects the (apparently) unitarianizing liberal picture of Jesus as a teacher of a reformed and purified Law and also the humanistic belief that man can by himself (or perhaps with a little divine help) achieve the good life and salvation. Man characteristically and always comes to an impasse which makes necessary his re-making and redemption by a force outside himself. This grace he apprehends through faith alone.

Now, says Bultmann, the New Testament itself, if it is rightly understood, contains the answer to modern man's perplexity. We must realize that much of its thinking is in mythical terms. It pictures a three-layer universe: heaven, the earth, and underneath the earth Gehenna or Hades, as the case may be. It is inhabited not only by men, animals, and plants but by God, the souls of the dead (in some pictures), and the angels and demons. The view of causality is not the modern scientific one. History is not thought of as a never-ending stream but as a series of dispensations and ages. The coming of Jesus, and his sacrificial Cross and Resurrection, mark the end of an old age and the beginning of a new. The powers of evil have been conquered and Christ will soon return to complete his work and usher in the new world where sin, suffering, and death no longer exist. This picture, he goes on to argue, is not only foreign to "modern" man and impossible for him to accept; it does not belong to the essence of the gospel but is only its husk. Therefore the way is open, not to throw it away altogether, as some liberal theologians did, but to reinterpret it and see the truth which is contained in the mythological language.⁵

The translation or reinterpretation runs somewhat as follows. Man

⁴R. Bultmann, *Das Urchristentum im Rahmen der antiken Religionen* (Zürich, 1949).

⁵A fuller summary is given by Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-20.

trusts in his own ability to order his life. He constructs codes of law which are believed to be of divine origin; he "boasts" (as Paul would say) of his ability to keep these laws and his achievement of obedience. He is confident in human wisdom, inventiveness, and labor. By these and by his economic, social, and political constructions, he seeks to get security, to postpone suffering and death as long as possible, and to find enjoyment of life. His existence is therefore dominated by desire and anxiety, which are the root of competition and war. Into this situation of frustration and death comes the gospel, which exposes the futility of the old way of life and shows a new way. Man is confronted with the outreaching love of God as shown in the Cross and Resurrection of Christ and forced to decide and choose whether he will keep his false security in human constructions or find true security in God. The way of faith involves, first of all, a new understanding of oneself, in which man gives up living "unto himself," trusts in God, and obeys him. To be sure, the Cross is an "objective" historical event, and perhaps the Resurrection is also, though it is not subject to the same kind of verification, but the important thing is that Cross and Resurrection together constitute one great event which as a salvation-occurrence is for us "nowhere present except in the proclaiming, accosting, demanding, and promising word of preaching."⁶ From this new understanding of oneself, and one's new relation to God through Christ, arises a new ethical obedience, in which the decisions of life—which one must make on one's own responsibility and apart from Law—are controlled by love of neighbor.

It is easy to see why this reinterpretation is attractive. It does away with many of the problems of miracle and "myth" which disturb the modern educated person. At the same time it avoids the presuppositions of the older (and to many discredited) liberalism, and establishes a connection with contemporary existentialist philosophy; uses it, and to some extent negates and transcends it. Finally it apparently preserves (even though it restates) the essential elements of Pauline and reformation theology. But so serious are the questions raised by Bultmann's reconstruction that not only have individual theologians criticized it severely, but church synods in Germany have taken official cognizance of the problem. In this connection I should

⁶*Theology of the N. T.*, p. 302. Anyone who reads those sections of this book which deal with Pauline theology can see that Bultmann's own ideas influence his treatment of Paul's.

mention the wise and temperate memorandum of the theological faculty of the University of Tübingen, addressed to the Church of Württemberg.⁷

Bultmann's severest critics accuse him of corrupting the youth, like Socrates; and of perverting the gospel, like Marcion. Unquestionably he has been misunderstood at many points. His sincere purpose is to make the gospel intelligible to modern man, yet a whole literature "explaining Bultmann," written by himself and others, is growing up, and a symposium on the subject, held at the meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis at New York in December, 1952, did not make matters much clearer to some of the hearers. There is therefore a problem of interpretation. Then, too, as the Tübingen faculty say, the best of Bultmann's disciples are not radicals but helpful theologians and pastors, and many of the horrible examples of Bultmannian influence are not close followers of the master at all. Yet, when all these allowances are made, "Bultmann's way is a dangerous way which can be understood as a radical undermining."⁸ It is therefore important to analyze the strength and weakness of his theology.

II

Two or three closely related problems must be disentangled. First of all, the unfortunately named process of demythologizing (*Entmythologisierung*). Every theologian, neo-orthodox, liberal, or conservative, has inevitably engaged in this. Pillars of Anglo-Catholic and Lutheran orthodoxy have reminded their hearers on Ascension Day that heaven is not somewhere up in the air. Some positions have been abandoned by almost everyone; the question is, how far can the process legitimately go? For the world view of the New Testament involves demons and angels, miracles of various sorts, the unique biblical eschatology (whatever it means), and, connected with this last, the saving event or events: the incarnation of the pre-existing divine Being, his miraculous birth, his descent into Hades after death, his resurrection, and his ascension.

Much of the debate has centered in eschatology. Leaving to one side those who in one way or another attempt to accept the whole traditional eschatology without question, there are at present roughly

⁷*Für und wider die Theologie Bultmanns* (Tübingen, 1952; Sammlung Gemeindeverständlicher Vorträge, Nos. 198/199). My analysis of the problem is greatly indebted to this pamphlet.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 40.

three schools. Oscar Cullmann and his followers regard a particular eschatology as an essential part of the New Testament message. According to Cullmann, the New Testament looks on God's redemptive activity in history as a line through history indefinitely extended at the beginning and the end, whose mid-point is the life and work of Christ. The decisive event of history has occurred ("V-day"), while the final consummation is still expected. Although the sacred history of the Bible contains mythical elements that cannot be verified historically, the acceptance in general of its view of history is essential to Christian faith. The so-called mythical element is a prophetic view, a value judgment, of a history that actually occurred, the essence of which is not purely mythical. Cullmann protests against any view of the New Testament which sees only a futuristic eschatology, or which replaces the temporal tension between present and future with the spatial contrast between here and there, earth and heaven.⁹

According to C. H. Dodd, it is "realized eschatology" which is dominant in the New Testament, even in the teaching of Jesus.¹⁰ The Kingdom of God is in a real sense already present. No one can deny that this point of view is that of the Fourth Gospel and is present here and there in Paul; here in fact is the first Christian *Entmythologisierung*. If this is the line taken by the New Testament, rather than the dialectic interpretation of Cullmann, eschatology need present no problem, and the tension is reduced if not abolished. The Kingdom of God can be found within believers or in their fellowship, the Church. While neither Cullmann nor Dodd attempts to do more than state the New Testament doctrine, one can see that two very different theologies might be founded on their insights: one preserving the eschatological hope in a realistic way, though with discrimination and criticism; the other a philosophy which sees the ideal and the phenomenal world in contrast, the veil between the two having been broken through, momentarily but decisively, by Christ. Dodd reinterprets the myth at this point, while Cullmann keeps it.

Bultmann, like most German scholars since Johannes Weiss, sees in the gospels a futuristic eschatology pure and simple. This view of the

⁹O. Cullmann, *Christ and Time*, tr. by F. V. Filson (Philadelphia, 1950). Cullmann's criticisms of Bultmann, pp. 28-32, 95-97, are particularly interesting. His own position on the uniqueness of N. T. eschatology seems to me to need some modification, since in the Old Testament and Judaism the time-line has a mid-point, the Exodus, and realized or inaugurated eschatology is not entirely foreign to the O. T., even though the emphasis is on the future.

¹⁰C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (New York, 1936).

future, which in the first two centuries disappointed the believers time after time, he considers simply impossible as a living faith for modern man. In place of it, like the Fourth Evangelist, he offers a demythologized eschatology. Just as Jesus represented in his own person the radical demand for decision,¹¹ so the gospel today confronts man in his short, insecure existence with the demand that he choose whom he will serve. The motive of the world's end is replaced by a different eschatological moment, but the same crisis and tension are present.

One might object that there are all sorts of "modern" men, and that all possible eschatologies are accepted by one or another of them; but Bultmann's concern is with the man to whom the thirteenth chapter of Mark makes no appeal at all; who may be open to the demand for faith and obedience but in whom no religious sentiment whatever is awakened by the words "and he shall come again, with glory, to judge the quick and the dead." There are many such men, and they are leaders in intellectual and political life. Do they have a place in the Christian Church, and does the New Testament have a message for them?

It is for these that Bultmann translates biblical language into modern idiom. But what is the significance of this process? Is it, as he and some of his defenders suggest, in no way different from the task that theology, preaching, and worship always undertake? If so, it is one way of looking at eschatology and the Cross and Resurrection, which throws light on some aspects of these ideas and events but is open to correction by the new insights of following generations. But if the world view of the New Testament is gone forever, and its permanent insights must be radically translated into another form of speech, we must in fact have a new Bible, a rewritten creed, and quite different forms of worship.¹² Some of Bultmann's critics fear that his methods necessarily imply the latter. It is an uncomfortable question, and one that, once raised, must be answered; the blame, however, does not lie with Bultmann but with the Greek thought-world in which Christian theologians, from Origen through Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, down to the present, have learned to analyze and ask questions. What, indeed, is Anselm's doctrine of the Atonement but a translation into a new language, part philosophy and part myth?

The second element in Bultmann's theology is existentialism. The present writer can claim no special competence here and must refer

¹¹*Theology of the N. T.*, p. 9.

¹²*Für und wider*, pp. 29 f.

his readers to chapter two of Henderson's excellent little essay. Existentialism is one of the significant intellectual movements of our time, though its influence in America, as compared with Europe, has been trivial. Kierkegaard, its progenitor, like Pascal and Dostoevsky, derived some of his deepest insights from St. Paul. Among his followers today are both Christian existentialists (including many of the so-called "neo-Orthodox") and secular ones who have subtracted from his philosophy the specifically Christian element. Bultmann naturally finds in existentialism an appropriate and relevant starting point for his interpretation of the gospel. On the other hand, he is highly critical of some of the positions taken by secular existentialists. His essay is a Christian answer to Heidegger, and it is only fair to say that he is not trying to make the Christian faith easy for secularists. Even his denial that the miracles are an integral part of the gospel is partly due to his conviction that faith should not be dependent on such crutches. The Good News is not to be proved, but accepted and obeyed. To rest its claims on signs and portents is not true faith. Jesus himself is the all-sufficient sign.

Bultmann's existentialism is a problem distinct from that of his demythologizing. He insists, however, that the two issues are organically connected, for he regards myth as fundamentally anthropological in its purpose and nature, rather than cosmological; it is man's attempt to understand his own existence.¹³ This narrow and, I believe, incorrect view of myth is one reason, why he chooses the existential philosophy; the other reason, of course, is that it speaks directly to European man.

As a result Bultmann thinks of man's redemption as essentially a new understanding of himself. There are two dangers in this. First, the redemption-occurrence comes perilously near to being a purely subjective transaction. As I read Bultmann, he seems to regard men as individual units redeemed apart from the Church and the society

¹³See *Kerygma und Mythos*, II, 183, for Bultmann's further arguments on myth as understanding of human existence. Of course it is true that even cosmological myths are related to man's interests and needs. Bultmann, in defending his philosophical position, argues: (1) that no interpreter of scripture operates without some philosophical position and concepts, even though he may not be conscious of this fact; (2) that the right philosophy to use is the one which is best adapted to give an understanding of human existence; (3) that his own existentialism does not commit him to any particular philosopher's existential interpretation of man but only to a method which concerns itself with man's existence; and (4) that, in particular, the existence philosophy does not necessarily exclude the relation between man and God. For the man of faith the latter becomes part of his experience. *Ibid.*, II, 192-94.

in which they live. In all fairness, one ought to say that this is partly because in the Lutheran theological tradition the place of the Church in the saving process does not extend very far beyond its function of preaching the gospel—Lutheran ecclesiology is implicit rather than explicit.¹⁴ But there is more to the issue than this. The saving event, as Bultmann describes it, does not seem to be effective save when the preached word directly reaches the hearer, and there seems to be no place for that element in redemption which comes through the permeation of the world by the gospel. The second danger is that redemption can be too easily divorced from the central events of Christianity.

Bultmann, in the second volume of *Kerygma und Mythos*, partly answers the first point. He does not deny the objective reality of God or his acts. "That God is not visible apart from faith does not mean that apart from faith he is not." The point is that God's acts, real though they are, are never apprehended or proved by scientific, "objective" means, but only by the believer who hears and recognizes the Word of God. Christ's death for man's salvation is seen and actualized only in what happens to the individual believer; yet the Word which now comes to man is one and the same which took its beginnings with the apostolic preaching and is imbedded in scripture.¹⁵

The second objection is more serious, and it is a question whether Bultmann has disposed of it. He has no intention of turning Christianity into a philosophy, but it certainly remains true that he finds the saving event only in the Cross. The birth, life and teaching of Jesus seem to have no independent significance for salvation.¹⁶ His radical gospel criticism, which leaves so little of Jesus' teaching as a secure foundation for such a faith, is one factor in producing this result. Those of us who do not follow him all the way in this are not in so great embarrassment. But the net result of Bultmann's position is that we are left with the demand to believe in someone whom we scarcely know. Jesus is the voice that calls for decision, but we are not sure just what is the ethical content of his

¹⁴Wilder objected that Bultmann's view of salvation has no social and corporate reference. Bultmann answers (*Ibid.*, II, 206, n. 2) that God's act indeed has social meaning but he inquires in what sense the words "social and corporate" can be used of an eschatological fellowship.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, II, 199, 206.

¹⁶*Für und wider*, pp. 24-26. The Tübingen faculty recognize that the same criticism can apply to Luther's teaching. Bultmann goes so far as to say that he cannot share Wilder's interest in the verification of the *historische Geschichte* of Jesus by historians (*Kerygma und Mythos*, II, 205, n. 1).

demand.¹⁷ Man is saved by faith in God through Christ, but this faith has relatively little connection with his earthly, historical life. Faith is, as Pascal said, a risk or wager, but Pascal believed that he had much greater certainty as to its implications. If God has entered once for all into history, and the Word has become flesh, it is not clear what purpose this Incarnation serves except to exhibit God's love through the Cross and to call man to decision. If we follow Bultmann in this, would not George Santayana be right in saying that it is only the *idea* of Christ in the gospels that is important?¹⁸ For Christ is in danger of becoming, as in some of the gnostic systems, a redeemer-symbol, a form the content of which does not matter greatly.

There also seems to be no place in Bultmann's system for the metaphysical and cosmic aspects of Christ's work. Is the world objectively different because Christ has lived, or is the difference made only in the individual soul? One can appreciate that too great a distinction can be drawn between the subjective and the objective, but what we call the subjective appropriation of salvation needs to have an objective ground. Bultmann's most recent answer clarifies his position here. The objective work of Christ impinges on our world only as the individual comes to faith and lives by faith.¹⁹

My own impression is that Bultmann has committed the ancient error of over-simplification. From the days of the Pythagoreans, who tried to explain reality through number, philosophers and theologians have often sought a simple, unitary solution for their basic problems. The faith of early Christianity is so rich and many-sided that philosophers have usually had to neglect some aspects of it in order to fit it into their systems. At least we can say that Christianity involves more than a conviction about man and his problems, central though the redemption of man may be. The eschatology of Paul contained a promise for the whole created world.

III

The word "myth" has unfortunate connotations. It is easy for us

¹⁷The point can be exaggerated, for Bultmann leaves something of Jesus' words. See *Theol. of the N. T.*, pp. 1-32 and his *Jesus and the Word*, tr. by L. P. Smith and E. Huntress (New York, 1934).

¹⁸George Santayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* (New York, 1946). It is curious that this book has received so little attention from N. T. scholars.

¹⁹*Für und Wider*, pp. 31f.; cf. also Wilder, *JBL*, LXIX (1950), p. 121; *Kerygma und Mythos*, II, 198-200.

te use it to describe the sacred stories and world-views of the Egyptians, Babylonians, and Greeks because we do not regard them as absolutely valid. We do not like the term to denote the Christian world view, and yet there seems to be no other convenient to include all sacred stories alike. And there is, of course, a difference, because most myths of other religions have no secure location in history, while the three peoples of the Book connect their sacred narratives with history—the Hebrews with the Exodus, and Christians and Moslems with the well-attested lives of Jesus and Muhammad.

Recent writers have begun to take the mythical element in religion more seriously than before, partly because of a realization of the inadequacy of language. As Irwin Edman says,

Ultimately all language is metaphorical. No discourse can ever do more than suggest or symbolize in the most roundabout fashion what is actually experienced. But by the choice of sensuously vivid words, by the association of our impressions with our passions or of our passions with our impressions, poetry comes nearer, perhaps, the heart of the matter than any other kind of language. It is for this reason that one cannot ever say exactly what a poem means or ever exactly or wholly translate it.²⁰

Myth is certainly akin to poetry; and, while the philosopher and theologian must do their best to translate and explicate rationally the meaning of a given myth, and, so far as possible, weave it into a system, it is precisely the untranslatable plus which is often the greatest contribution of the myth to our appreciation of reality.²¹

Ernst Cassirer has attempted to deal philosophically with the interpretation of mythology.²² The English reader will find enough for a good beginning in Dr. and Mrs. Henri Frankfort's essay in *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*. The Frankforts define myth as

a form of poetry which transcends poetry in that it proclaims a truth; a form of reasoning which transcends reasoning in that it

²⁰Irwin Edman, *Arts and the Mon: A Short Introduction to Aesthetics* (New York, 1952), pp. 69 f.

²¹At this point, Bultmann would answer as follows: Those who insist that in religion mythological language is indispensable often do not realize that they themselves demythologize when they speak of "symbols." To "understand" a myth is more than rationally to explicate it; it includes the recognition that mysteries still exist (*Kerygma und Mythos*, II, 185 f., 189 f.).

²²E. Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen II: Das mythische Denken* (Berlin, 1925); *An Essay on Man* (Garden City, 1953), chap. 7. It is curious that his name so seldom occurs in the discussion of Bultmann's demythologizing.

wants to bring about the truth it proclaims; a form of action, of ritual behavior, which does not find its fulfilment in the act but must proclaim and elaborate a poetic form of truth.

Myth . . . is to be taken seriously, because it reveals a significant, if unverifiable, truth—we might say a metaphysical truth. But myth has not the universality and the lucidity of theoretical statement. It is concrete, though it claims to be inassailable in its validity. It claims recognition by the faithful; it does not pretend to justification before the critical.²³

Susanna Hare, in discussing the reliefs of Ashurnasirpal II, remarks:

The pseudo-scientific methods which had been evolved for purposes of divination were functionally bound to the widely ramified body of religious beliefs, and art, as much as embryonic science, was the counterpart of mythology, an expression of religious awareness. All united to give man the power that comes with further extension of consciousness; knowledge had not been divided into compartments. The function of art was therefore a pre-aesthetic one, the plastic expression of a fundamental concept. What may appear a crude attempt at naturalism is in actuality the result of a method of approach whereby an abstract idea is expressed by the juxtaposition of whatever visual elements suggest themselves. In fact, the content of any mythology is in part built up by the reciprocal action of sensual and conceptual elements. . . .²⁴

That these lines of reasoning are applicable to the New Testament is immediately obvious. When Jesus, for example, spoke of God knowing every sparrow that falls, and of his care for the birds and plants (Matt. 6:26-29=Luke 12:24-27; Matt. 10:29-31=Luke 12:6 f.), his language was, in the broad sense of the word, mythological. To try to turn this into prose usually results in some loss. Fundamentalists attempts to justify myth and miracle as equivalent to "objective, scientific reality" are not true to the thought of ancient man. For him, everything significant was miraculous, whether it could be explained "naturally" or not. The hard-headed Ecclesiastes reminds his hearers of the mystery of the child's bones growing in the womb (Eccl. 11:5). Too sharp a distinction between the natural and the

²³H. Frankfort and others, *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (Chicago, 1946), pp. 7 f.; abridged Pelican edition, *Before Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, 1949), pp. 15 f. Cf. the definition of Sir James G. Frazer, quoted in S. H. Hooke, ed., *Myth and Ritual* (London, 1933), p. 1.

²⁴Susanna Hare in *The Great King: King of Assyria: Assyrian Reliefs in the Metropolitan Museum of Art* (New York, 1945), p. 11.

supernatural is religiously degrading to both; it takes the natural one step away from God and it tends to make the supernatural too much of an interruption of the natural course of events. Perhaps it preserves something of the wonder of miracle but it destroys that of the natural order.

Yet some demythologizing is inevitable. The area in which mythology is useful has been narrowed. We cannot possibly use it to give a complete explanation of the appearance of fossils in rocks, the stratification of the Grand Canyon, the summer thunderstorm, the movements of the planets, or the evolution of the *Compositae*. Where science can describe, it is its duty to do so. Furthermore, the man who philosophizes and analyzes must explain as much of the mythical as he can by means of his own methods if he is to keep his peace of mind and his spiritual integrity.

In his approach to miracle, Bultmann is on fairly strong ground. He rejects the concepts of miracle and the supernatural only as something imposed upon the causal, scientifically observed sequence of events or as a way of short-circuiting scientific explanation. Miracle remains as the believer's interpretation of events. The man of faith can see an event, in the light of God's Word, as an act of God, even when its meaning is still enigmatic to him. For him the world has ceased to be a closed system.²⁵

In the light of our present understanding of myth the distinction between natural and revealed theology is weakened. Ancient myth, like Greek philosophy, is man's response to the mysterious world around him, and both contain a real apprehension of truth. The Hebrew and Christian myths differ from the others not so much in their approach and method—epistemologically they are not unique—as in the fact that one righteous, loving and transcendent God stands supreme.²⁶ No longer is the purpose of myth to explain relations between man and nature—the ancient Church rejected the gnostic speculations—but to set forth the story of God's holy will in relation to both man and nature.

Obviously the two mythologies of Egypt and Babylonia are constructed on the basis of the peculiar conditions of life and social organizations prevailing in each country. Translated into propositions, the two world-views contain some inconsistencies within themselves and very great contradictions to one another. In the Bible, and

²⁵*Kerygma und Mythos*, II, 197 f.

²⁶*Intellectual Adventure*, pp. 667-71; *Before Philosophy*, pp. 241-44.

particularly in the New Testament, the progress is toward one great and masterful world-view which is intended to be valid for all nations and all time. Yet within the biblical world-view there is no completely consistent system. Reality is hinted at by a number of pictures, which may from the rationalistic point of view be conflicting. Mythopoeic thought deals with various aspects of God's world by giving various stories to illustrate each, not by trying to include these aspects in a coherent system.²⁷ In one Old Testament passage, Abraham bargains with God to save the city of Sodom, arguing that God cannot contravene what all men recognize as right (Gen. 18:25); in other passages, the standard of right is precisely God's will, which cannot be measured by human standards (Isa. 45:9). Certainly monotheistic thought must take cognizance of both these elements. Likewise St. Paul in attempting to suggest what has happened to the believer uses a whole series of pictures—redemption out of slavery, expiation of a tabu, vindication in a lawcourt, reconciliation of one who has been an enemy, annulment of an indenture of enslavement, new slavery to Christ, the coming of age of a minor, and a decisive victory over the demonic forces. Some of these are frankly mythological problems. To whom was the ransom paid? Was God, as well as man, an enemy? The fact is that language is not sufficient to describe the reality, and the only language that begins to be adequate is pictorial.

The Christian story, like the Exodus and the Exile, is rooted in solid historical fact. Not only can we locate it in space and time, but we know a considerable amount about it. Surrounding the hard facts, such as the main lines of Jesus' teaching, his controversies with the Pharisees, and his Crucifixion, is an historical penumbra: various incidents which claim to be part of the event and which, while not capable of scientific or historical proof, have a high degree of probability—for example, some of the miracles, the resurrection appearances, and some kind of self-witness on the part of Jesus. Somewhere in these two areas, though historians differ as to what they include, is the historical core.

The New Testament also includes mythological or *heilsgeschichtlich* interpretations of the factual material. Bultmann finds two stages in this, the first of which he calls eschatological or *geschichtlich* (as distinguished from *historisch*). The *geschichtlich* meaning of the Cross is

²⁷This is also characteristic of rabbinic thought, which makes no attempt to reconcile God's lovingkindness and his justice; see Max Kadushin, *Organic Thinking* (New York, 1938); *The Rabbinic Mind* (New York, 1952).

that which it has for the Christian as different from all other historical events and relevant for man's life today. This is fundamentally the assignment of *religious* value to the event, and this type of interpretation pervades the Bible. For the Christian the event is permanent and divine, as the death of Socrates or the self-offering of the Pawnee Indian hero Petalesharoo²⁸ never could be. The rich typology which connects New Testament events with the Exodus belongs to this kind of thinking. The Christian thought in a *geschichtlich* manner and continues to do so today, partly because this is *his* story, confirmed by the Church's religious experience and his own, but partly, I believe, because of the context in which the story of the Cross is set. If Jesus had not been, at one and the same time, the announcer of the Kingdom of God, a teacher in whom the unresolved issues of Judaism found an answer, and finally, one who stayed at his prophetic post even though it meant his death, I question whether the early Christians would have placed the same valuation on his life and death. He came in the fulness of time and met a very definite situation.

But, as Bultmann goes on to say, this event is also described in a strictly mythical way as the sacrificial death of the sinless son of God, which is either an expiation or a propitiation and in any case makes things right as they were not before. This judgment could be made only on the basis of faith, and it involves a bolder leap of the religious imagination than the *geschichtlich* interpretation. In the same classification is such a story as the Temptation, which dramatizes three of the very real temptations of Jesus' ministry as a personal conflict with Satan. This is true whether Jesus, or someone else, is the original narrator of the story. Perhaps the same is true of the Baptism and the Transfiguration, in which case actual religious experiences are given pictorial and dramatic form. To reinterpret these one has to ask what the symbols may have originally meant in a Jewish and first century context.

There are, finally, mythical or sacred stories that do not correspond to any incident of early Christian experience whatever. The most obvious example is the hymn (so Lohmeyer identified it) in Phil. 2:5-11. Here is one who possessed the nature of God, who neverthe-

²⁸Petalesharoo determined to abolish human sacrifice and offered to die in the victim's place if she could not be released in any other way; see Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953), pp. 130-33. Redfield cites the original sources.

less did not cling to this privilege but divested himself of it and took the nature of a slave, submitting to all human conditions, even to the death on the Cross. But God has exalted him again and conferred on him a name of unique glory. The essential part of the myth occurs before and after the earthly life, no one could have directly experienced it, and it is a revelation, by which we mean an imaginative construct of faith which commends itself to us. It cannot be made subject to criticism, it can only be accepted or rejected. On the other hand, it is just one of several slightly different pictures—the Second Man from heaven of I Cor. 15:45-49, the Incarnate Logos of John, the eternal Son of Hebrews—all of which have the same general point, no one of which would be adequate by itself, all of which are needed to set forth the faith. The question is, how adequately can these be reinterpreted? The controversies of the Ecumenical Councils are an index of the success and failure of the Greeks in employing their philosophical methods.

Up to now we have failed to mention one of the elements which the Frankforts include in their definition of myth. Ancient mythology was never divorced from ritual (unless the Hermetic writings furnish a sophisticated exception). Myth is a form of action, of ritual behavior, which has a significance beyond the action itself, and which proclaims a truth. Baptism and the Lord's Supper, as Paul and the Fourth Evangelist understood them, are excellent examples of this point. They are rooted in sacred story, they make the story contemporaneous and relevant to the believer and the believing group, and they are intended to produce an effect. They are eschatological, in that they gather up past, present and future in one sacred moment. Because of their connections with the life of Jesus and first century Judaism, nothing else can quite take their place. Any demythologizing and reinterpretation that we can manage belong properly not to the acts themselves, which are simple and obvious, but to the framework of prayer and instruction in which they are set, and this ought to do two things: recapture the spirit of early Christianity and also make the acts relevant to man's present life. Certainly the demythologizing (and perhaps remythologizing) which satisfied the sixteenth century reformers is not altogether meaningful now. And it ought to be remembered that, as all myths are partial and poetic glimpses of truth, so are the Christian sacraments. Though they are unique vehicles for Christian ritual action, they are not absolutes. They point

beyond themselves to the truth of the divine event as it was seen in manifold form by the early Christians.

The proclamation of the gospel was also very probably a form of ritual action for the early Christians. Paul not only speaks of the Good News as a power of God for salvation (Rom. 1:16) but also mentions Jesus Christ as placarded before the eyes of the Galatians (Gal. 3:1) and he speaks of the effect upon sinners who come into the Corinthian church (I Cor. 14:24 f.). One who wishes another example of the Word as ritual has only to turn to Melito of Sardis' *Homily on the Passion*, where the preacher steps out of his own rôle into that of the victorious and risen Christ. An account of the myth and ritual of the ancient Church is not complete without the Christian prophet.

The first century was a time of the overlapping of cultures. In the empire there were men trained in the philosophic disciplines, there was a great deal of primitive religion, and there was one high monotheistic religion, Judaism. As the Frankforts point out, Parmenides tried, in a scientific fashion, to effect the complete emancipation of philosophy from mythology, but even in the Greek world this position was not maintained. The dominance of mythological thinking can be seen in the Gnostics, whose systems of emanations remarkably recall those of ancient Egyptian thought. The New Testament thinkers did not exhaust their energies in the theoretical explanation of creation, the Fall and the origin of evil; they kept their minds firmly fixed on the basic faith that God is the Lord of history and has entered into it. If I may here indulge in *geschichtlich* thinking, I would point out that the event which is decisive for Christians occurred not among the philosophically trained (Paul thought that God had chosen the more naïve part of the world as the theatre of redemption, I Cor. 1:20), but in the mythopoeic world of Judaism. This is providential, for the result was that more aspects of the event were apprehended, and by a larger group of people.

Thus the characteristic language of divine revelation is mythical, imaginative, and poetic. As man tries to understand monotheistic religion and correlate it with scientific knowledge, a certain amount of demythologizing or reinterpretation is inevitable, as in the case of the Ascension, the descent into Hades, and the visit of the Magi. Certain aspects of mythological thought simply have to be left behind, usually with no serious shock to faith. It is the duty of the theologian to carry over into the new language as much of the essence of

the myth as possible; a reduced or truncated translation will not do. And of course the old stories remain. One does not cease to read and love the Epiphany gospel. No matter how much reinterpretation is needed when a new generation is initiated into the Christian faith, particularly if that generation is university trained, Christianity involves a knowledge and positive appreciation of the biblical narratives themselves. For the story of man's salvation is a divine self-disclosure but one which men have had to see for themselves and wonder at, and therefore, while the revelation is absolute, both the vision of it and the forms in which that vision are recounted are human and relative.

Therefore Wilder is right when he says, "If we recognize that the central thing in the New Testament is a message concerning the divine action, it is a much more difficult thing to discard the so-called mythology."²⁹ One weakness of Bultmann's position is his insistence that all myth—i.e. whatever in the sacred story does not fit the scientific world-view, whatever describes the Beyond (*Jenseits*) in terms of Here (*Diesseits*)—must be discarded unless it is translated, since no myth any longer has authority. But in practice he does not translate, but simply eliminates, certain mythical elements—notably the cosmological element in world redemption—because they are not meaningful to him. Some of us will agree with him that it is difficult to pick and choose, yet we cannot help discriminating between those poetic and imaginative pictures which enshrine the central elements of the faith and those which are of lesser importance. And not everyone is agreed as to which are the central elements. Part of the difficulty is in the word "demythologizing." I do not regard it as an adequate description of the task of the theologian and teacher, for this task includes initiating people into the true understanding and valuation of myth—though Bultmann calls this demythologizing too, since the myth is no longer accepted with complete literalness.

There is, finally, a third way of dealing constructively with myth, which might be called *remythologizing*. This was the method of Dante, Milton, and Bunyan. A new and non-biblical myth will never have quite the same authority and validity as the old, and there is perhaps an increased danger of confusing what is fortuitous and temporary with the essence of the gospel, and so of "modernizing" the story of Jesus. Yet it is probable that more of the essence of

²⁹A. N. Wilder, *JBL*, LXIX (1950), p. 123. Note also his remarks on p. 124. and on p. 119 (referring to Harbsmeier's article).

biblical religion can be carried over through a new and relevant myth than in any other way.

Some risk is involved in any attempt at interpretation—either that of modernizing, if we interpret myth philosophically or by a new myth, or that of archaizing ourselves, if we try to feel our way into the ancient thought-world. But the values that come from understanding and faith are worth the risk. We can only hope that if new philosophers, or new seers of visions, arise, they will make use of the results of modern study and understand the historic biblical record as fully as possible, so that it is the New Testament faith which is actually presented.

DIVERS ORDERS IN THE MINISTRY

By H. F. WOODHOUSE

Wycliffe College, Toronto

It is generally accepted that there are differences between bishops, priests, and deacons although it is not so well known that certain authorities, some of the early Fathers and others eminent Roman Catholic divines, have held that there is no difference in order between bishops and priests.¹

While investigating the subject of the ministry in Anglican writers of the Elizabethan period, I paid particular attention to the writings of Jewel and Whitgift (as contained in the Parker Society edition of their works) and also to those of Hooker and Richard Field (using the 1847 edition of the latter's great book *Of the Church*). The following pages represent an attempt to set out the relevant material concerning different orders and especially to establish the meaning of the terms used. This is necessary before the nature, extent, and reasons for inequality can be decided. For those interested, the references given will enable them to make further search. Much of my space has been devoted to Field, partly because of possible misunderstanding of his phraseology, partly because he deals fairly extensively with the point, and partly because of the magnificent coherence and systematic nature of his work. Furthermore, the fol-

¹N. Dimock, *Christian Unity*, pp. 5-12, and K. E. Kirk, ed., *The Apostolic Ministry*, ch. V, esp. pp. 340ff.; but see S. Neill, ed., *The Ministry of the Church*, p. 66.

lowing pages will show how far Field shares the view which would minimize, if not obliterate, differences between bishops and priests in their ministerial function. For all these reasons it is regrettable that the writer of the chapter on this period in *The Apostolic Ministry*, whose thesis is that the episcopate is the essential ministry, does not even mention him. This simple fact of itself would tend to preclude acceptance of the positions advanced in the chapter of that work. But before considering Field let us turn to Jewel, Whitgift, and Hooker. Jewel used the word "orders" to mean status, standing, power to fulfil certain functions; and when he spoke of the divergent opinions of men on the question of differences between bishops and priests, he used the word "degrees" as a synonym having to do with ecclesiastical ministry.²

I do not remember Whitgift using the word "orders;" he does speak of "degrees," and from this and another passage it is obvious that he would have held that bishops and presbyters were equal in their power to do ministerial acts. By the word "degree" he seems to mean dignity and status as regards government.³

Chapter seventy-eight of Hooker's fifth book has the title, "Of degrees of ministers." Here the word "degrees" means differences in power or functions or grades or "offices of ecclesiastical calling." This is the meaning in all the different places in this chapter.⁴ When Hooker uses the word "order" he does so in the sense of ministry or ministerial rank. The word "orders" means ranks or grades, and so does the word "degrees" as used in the next sentence. Hence "orders" and "degrees" may be regarded as synonyms.

Later, Hooker says that part of the difference between bishops and presbyters is the "latitude of the power of order" possessed by the former. There is not a difference in order but in "latitude of the power of order." He also mentions the greater power of jurisdiction of the bishop.⁵ Hence the earlier phrase refers rather to ministerial powers than to those of governance, so that "order" then would mean ministerial calling. Part of this power of order is to consecrate holy widows and virgins to the service of God, and also peculiar to bishops, he says, has always been "the power to give the power of order"

²Vol. III, pp. 271-3; and cf. II. pp. 1103 and 1124.

³Vol. II, pp. 254 and 261.

⁴*Op. cit.*, sects. 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12.

⁵Vii, vi, 1 and 3; cf. v. lxxvii, 2.

unto others. Here also order would mean "ecclesiastical calling."⁶ He mentions that as touching power of order some seen no difference between bishops and presbyters, though he does not agree.⁷ To Hooker, then, power of order meant authority to perform ministerial acts, and there is a difference in latitude of order between bishops and presbyters.

Let us now turn to Field's usage of these terms. What does Field mean by the phrase "all equal in the power of order"? Is "power of order" the authority to ordain, or the authority to perform ministerial acts, or both? Does Field mean the same thing as when he says in another place that bishops and presbyters differ in a kind of dignity and office or employment only.⁸ Field, in the above quotation, has made a definite contrast between "power or order" and "government;" hence our effort to find his meaning must be focussed on the phrase "power of order." Some help toward understanding his meaning is found elsewhere. "The power of holy or ecclesiastical order, is nothing else but that power which is specially given to men sanctified and set apart from others, to perform certain sacred supernatural and eminent actions, which others of another rank may not at all, or, not ordinarily, meddle with; as, to preach the word, administer the sacraments, and the like."⁹ Both here and later the phrase "power of order" is defined. In both contexts the power of order would be the same in bishops and presbyters. The power of order is *not then* the authority to ordain but the authority and prerogatives received at ordination; the two definitions say this is an authority to preach the word and administer the sacraments.¹⁰ It is not said that power of order includes the right to ordain.

On the other hand, Field seems to create a difficulty in this matter for he says later (as if in agreement with the statement), "The fathers described unto us such a bishop as hath eminent and peerless power, without whose consent the presbyter can do nothing." He is above presbyters "not in order only, but in degree also and power of jurisdiction." What does Field mean by the words "not in order only"? It should be noted that he used the word "order," not the phrase "power of order." He remarks that some ("the best learned

⁶Vii, vi, 2 and 3; and cf. VII, ii, 3, and xiv, 10.

⁷VII, vi, 3.

⁸Vol. I, p. 322.

⁹Vol. I, p. 319, and Vol. III, p. 209.

¹⁰Vol. I, p. 321, and cf. Vol. III, p. 209.

among the schoolmen") hold that bishops are not greater than presbyters in the power of consecration or order (that is what they have received when ordained) "but only in the exercise of it, and in the power of jurisdiction," since both preach and administer the sacraments.¹¹ "Not in order only": these appear the difficult words, though perhaps the difficulty is more apparent than real, and it is resolved if the word "order" means "rank" or "position," which seems probable.

In this chapter (V, xxvii) Field uses the phrase "power of order" to describe that which enables men to perform ministerial functions. Field contends that as Churches grew in extent and numbers one was appointed to be chief pastor and "the rest should be but his assistants, not presuming to do anything without him; so that though they were all equal in the power of order, yet were the rest inferior unto him in the government of that Church whereof he was pastor, and they but his assistants only." Here again "power of order" means ability and authority to perform those ministerial functions mentioned earlier.

Later, when Field speaks of order or consecration, what does he mean? Does "order" mean authority or status to perform ministerial acts, or is it the authority to confer power so to act? We believe Field uses it in the former sense and this supports our previous interpretation of the word.¹²

There is another consideration in the sentence; "The bishop in each Church is above and before the rest of the presbyters of the same, not in order only, but in degree also and power of jurisdiction."¹³ What do the words "in degree" mean? The preceding chapter bears the title, "Of the orders and degrees of them that are trusted with the ministry of the word and sacraments." Are order, degree, power of jurisdiction different things? We think that Field's usage of the word "orders" justifies us in regarding him as using the word in the same sense as men commonly do when they speak of "three orders" of the ministry. The word "degrees" certainly means that there is a difference in status, other than power of jurisdiction, between a bishop and a presbyter.

The most probable meaning is that Field holds that, in each diocese, the bishop is superior to the other presbyters of that particular diocese in power of jurisdiction, in status, and in order, using this word

¹¹Vol. III, pp. 213-214, 216.

¹²Vol. I, pp. 318 and 321f.; and cf. Vol. III, p. 216.

¹³Vol. III, p. 214.

in the sense that the others are his assistants and that they, as Field quotes from Tertullian, cannot, without his consent, perform ministerial acts.¹⁴ They are not independent, each in his own charge, but dependent on him who delegates a commission to them. Field holds that this superior position has been given to the bishop for the purpose of safeguarding the peace and welfare of the Church. He proceeds to state that the power of the sacred order, that is authority to inter-meddle with things pertaining to the service of God, and to perform eminent acts of gracious efficacy, "is equal and the same in all those whom we call presbyters."¹⁵

At present much of the tension within the Anglican Church centers upon different views of the ministry. One school asserts that the episcopate is essential to the nature of the Church but fails to convince the other of the vital theological significance of the episcopate.¹⁶ Because of this fact we might well consider a different line of approach to see if it would be more fruitful. This article suggests that one possible approach might be to find out what exactly we mean by the terms "bishop" and "presbyter" and what are the differences between them. We have confined discussion to the Elizabethan period and we have seen that certain results are apparent; the chief of these is that the difference between bishop and presbyter lay in the jurisdiction exercised by the former, and that to him was committed the authority to ordain, an authority which Hooker said was given to him by the Church.¹⁷ The next step would be to see if these results agreed with those of succeeding generations. This examination of terms might well be minute and laborious, but it would be a help to clarity of thought. Such a search would certainly be in accord with Anglican respect for precedent, and might provide a fresh and valuable contribution to a question which at present bears far too strong a resemblance to an impasse.

¹⁴Vol. III, p. 214ff.

¹⁵Vol. I, p. 321; and cf. Vol. III, p. 212.

¹⁶See A. G. Hebert in *Theology*, Dec., 1951.

¹⁷Hooker, Book VIII, vi, 2 and 3.

CHRISTIANITY AND PSYCHOLOGY

By ROBERT JORDAN

The University of the South

The Christian who wishes to preserve his reason as well as his faith—which is, I take it, an ideal of the Anglican tradition—must struggle with the problem of reconciling incompatibles. Like the atheist who wishes to abandon himself to *The Divine Comedy*, he finds the task of accommodating modern psychology within the context of Christian teaching something of a strain.

I fancy that much of the unspoken criticism of psychology, especially the psychology of Freud, his colleagues and successors, is based upon the conviction that it is in some way destructive of what nice and sensible people have always believed to be good, true, and beautiful. I limit the subject matter to depth psychology, so-called, because that branch of psychology acknowledges, at least, the existence of a psyche and even proposes a theory of personality addressed to the human person rather than to the white rat, thus achieving a certain advance over behaviorism. But, more significantly, it is the branch of psychology which is thought to be especially antagonistic to or unsympathetic with religious beliefs.

Although the whole development of psychology during the last hundred years might be felt to constitute a threat to religion, it is Freudism with its several corollaries which has been felt to do so in a peculiarly provocative way. Freud was outspoken in his opposition to religion, writing about it under the title *The Future of an Illusion*. It must be granted that Freud defines "illusion" in a special way, but this technical device does not, as some writers on Freud seem to think, make his book other than anti-religious. It remains a typical expression of the conflict between religion and psychology.

Dismissal by denunciation will not do. A comedian once defined psychoanalysis as "the disease for which it claims to be the cure", a jibe which has point only because of the preposterous intellectual gesturing of some of Freud's self-styled disciples. The baffled and unambitious are often rebellious, but Christians should beware of dismissing Freud on the basis of a few encounters with the spongy minds of the second-rate. Freud himself is another matter. However,

while it goes without saying that he was a great psychologist, it cannot be said, I think, that he was more than that without constructing myths. He was, for instance, an extraordinarily bad philosopher. This would be nothing against him, of course, except that, at least occasionally, he attempted to philosophize. Indeed, it is just because Freud's work contains something more than descriptive psychology that it is appropriate to speak of psychoanalysis *and* Christianity. Otherwise, the conjunction would be meaningless, like psychoanalysis and the history of the potato or psychoanalysis and advanced algebra.

When we speak, then, of psychoanalysis and Christianity, we suppose that there is some conflict between them. This is inevitable because there is, indeed, a conflict—such that if Freudism is true as an account of the human person, then it is difficult to see how Christianity could possibly be true or even credible. And if Christianity is true, then the Freudian theory, as a whole, cannot be true. It could, of course, be effective as a therapeutic technique—but that is another question altogether. Consequently, the conflict must be accepted as the fact that it is.

This is not always easy to do because, as Christians, we often feel embarrassed in acknowledging that Christianity is in opposition to theories said to be modern, progressive, and scientific. I don't know why this should be so. To be a Christian is to be opposed to what is non-Christian. Furthermore, since Christianity is a radical doctrine, to be a Christian is to be radically opposed to what is non-Christian. This doesn't mean that we shall advocate roasting our adversaries. But it doesn't mean that we shall advocate their theories either. There is no more dangerous notion than that of supposing that the Christian can pick from the intellectual garden, as one selects flowers from weeds, just those blooms whose excellence seems to harmonize with Christian doctrine. That presupposes, at least, agreement about what is a flower and what is a weed. If they have any self-respect the thinkers from whom the Christian would snatch bits of truth will simply not allow their systems to be picked to pieces. So, one has not disposed of Freud or of depth psychology generally when one has shown that certain Freudian themes may be accommodated within the Christian conception of man. One has simply torn a fragment from its context and put another construction upon it.

Certain systems of thought are opposed to certain other systems of

thought so as to preclude any genuine synthesis. A radical opposition remains. This is not always and inevitably the case. It is no accident, for example, that Christian doctrine is a synthesis, in part, of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. These are morally absolutistic and metaphysically realistic philosophies—and so is Christianity in so far as it embodies a philosophy. But no one has synthesized Christianity and the atomism of Democritus—and no one ever will. No one has synthesized Freudism and Christianity—and no one ever will. As *whole* systems of thought they are incompatible. We should get rid of the notion that, as Christians, we can take over the ideas of Freud without bothering to refute the theory of human existence and personality which Freud proposes.

On the other hand, because systems of thought are opposed as a whole it does not follow that they must be opposed in every other way as well. I propose, then, to consider the present topic by discussing (1) what I take to be the most valuable contribution of Freud to the general understanding of human nature, (2) the weakness of the Freudian position from the philosophic and religious point of view, (3) the reason why the problem of anxiety in general underscores the significance of Freud's work so as to make it virtually impossible to over-estimate his contribution to psychology and, (4) the reason, very briefly, why Christianity offers a better solution to the problems which plague the human soul than can be offered by psychoanalytic theory or any other theory of human nature.

I realize how misleading it must be to speak of *one* contribution of the psychoanalytic movement when several come at once to mind: the significance of dreams, the insight into the importance of the early years of life for the later development of personality, the concept of the unconscious mind, and the enormous significance of the doctor-patient relationship with its interesting implications for the relationship of priest and penitent. But these are technical matters belonging to the context of psychology itself. I do not wish to ignore them. However, in suggesting another kind of contribution I refer rather to the total impact of Freudian theory on the climate of opinion in which we all live, rather than to the specific results of a therapeutic method. With or without the method, the effects of the theory must concern all of us whether we realize it or not and whether we like it or not.

The sort of contribution I have in mind is reflected in the following observation by Lionel Trilling:

The Freudian psychology is, I think, the only systematic account of human nature which, in point of subtlety and complexity, of interest and tragic power, deserves to stand beside the chaotic accumulation of insights which literature has made over the centuries; it is therefore not surprising that its effect upon literature should be great.¹

The same quotation also provides the occasion for an indispensable distinction. Literature's account of human nature seems chaotic, but there is a reason for that. And the literary man, because of it, enjoys an advantage in freedom which is denied the moralist and the theologian. The literary man's principal aim is revelatory description. His judgments are descriptive judgments. If he makes what are called normative statements, statements about how things ought to be, he does so indirectly and almost incidentally. If the poet or dramatist makes a point of his ethical insight he risks being roundly condemned for being moralistic. But a moral philosopher *must* concern himself with the normative or else capitulate as a competent practitioner of his profession. We expect the moralist to take morality as his theme.

One of the consequences of this divided labor is that, one way or another, the moralist is forced to think in terms of the Garden of Eden. He must dream dreams not only of perfectibility but of perfection. For life, especially the moral life, is never static. It is always in process, always moving toward something. But there is no point in moving unless one knows what one is moving toward. And so, if the action which constitutes the moral life is to make any sense, if it is ever to arrive at anything significant and permanently valuable, it must be specified by ends. It is, consequently, the task of the moralist, a thankless task always, to concern himself with ends and goals. Otherwise, action will never be specified and will remain forever irrational. Now, the most obvious characteristic of these ends is that they do not yet exist as actualized. They are real enough but they are not, except in the rarely perfected moral life, fully actual. They remain to be actualized. Unhappily, these distinctions are not readily made in practice and some people are so unfortunate as to be

¹"The Legacy of Sigmund Freud, II. Literary and Aesthetic", *Kenyon Review*, Vol. II, Spring 1940, No. 2, p. 152.

unable to make them even in theory, the result being that the moralist must continuously suffer the criticism that he is out of touch with the common life. He sometimes deserves this criticism—not in principle, but because he sometimes neglects his secondary task—that of description.

The secondary task of the moralist is the primary concern of the literary man and the psychologist. It is the analysis and description of the contemporary, the here and now, with its wonderful diversity and its terrifying conflict. I happen to believe that the secondary task of the writer and the psychologist is the moral question. But, whether or not I am right about that, it is surely not the first concern. I have conjoined literature and psychology. And yet psychology, if it was ever to become a science, had to do more than collect bits of information and fragments of gnomic wisdom. It could not establish itself by writing bad novels. In short, it could not be literary. But, in a way, its subject matter is the same as the novelist's. It had, therefore, to introduce a methodology and, in the process, it reduced human nature to a formula. In the interest of economy and precision it dropped away all eccentricity, minimized conflict, drained response of everything save its quantitative surge—and transformed the human being into a type. At least it did this until Freud put a stop to it. And how did he do this?

I suggest that he did it by exposing with merciless candor the utter absurdity of the idea that man is a simple child of nature, that he is, through and through, good and noble, and that he has only to be released from the restraints of moral and religious convention in order to move surely and swiftly to his perfection in complete and simple-minded happiness. Naturalism would have us accept this preposterous legacy of an antiseptic rationalism in the name of enlightenment and in the face of our greatest philosophic and literary traditions. Eliseo Vivas has reminded us, very strikingly, that man, as the poets and sages have seen him, is a marvelous instrument for the play of opposites and a tragic being,

He is in love with life but also hates it deeply and subtly. He is capable of crime and sin but also has a tyrannical and whimsical conscience that tortures him for trivial misdemeanors as brutally as it punishes him for unpardonable sins. Narcissistic, he hates himself; full of insufferable vanity, he seeks to humiliate himself; the victim of systematic self-deception, he is capable of unsparing self-knowledge. But, above all, in what he wants he

is hopelessly confused, vague, self-deceived, inconsistent and divided.²

Now if, as both Trilling and Vivas suggest, such knowledge of man was accessible to us long ago in our own literature, is Freud not repeating what we have always known? In a way he is, and even in a much narrower and less dramatic way, but with an all-important difference. Freud establishes his view of human conflict within the context of a methodology which, if it does not rival the method of physics and chemistry, is still genuinely scientific. His insights are generalized to form the basis of a hypothesis and are coupled with a method of prediction and control and with a workable technique for therapeutic practice. This is about as much as a scientist can do with a subject matter that talks back.

Ignoring the hazard of over-simplification, the point might be made quite simply: Freud has made it impossible, whether he thought so or not, and I am sure he did not, to reject as ridiculous or unnatural the Christian doctrine of original sin. Of course, from the Christian point of view, that is only part of the story; the other part, the astonishing part, is forgiveness, but forgiveness has no place in psychology.

In fairness to Freud he must not be forced into the role of defender of the faith. Besides, it is a role he could not possibly assume because, while he understood guilt, he had no conception of sin, which brings me to the weakness of Freudism. Again, in speaking of weaknesses, I pass over those errors which are significant only within the context of depth psychology and its history: over-emphasis on the libido as a driving energy, excessive stress on the past of the individual to the neglect of present conflicts, and others which psychiatrists are making good by extending their work and revising their theories. The weakness I wish to suggest is of another sort—which depth psychology has not made good and which, I believe, it cannot make good because the problem is not a psychological problem at all but rather a philosophical and even a theological problem. The fact that psychologists think they have made it good or that they will make it good is the whole point of the conflict between psychology and Christianity.

As everyone knows, Freud's work was carried out within the con-

²Eliseo Vivas, *The Moral Life and the Ethical Life*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1950, p. 60.

text of abnormal psychic life. The immediate task which he and his students had to face was the development of psychotherapeutic techniques for the cure of mental abnormality. But that activity is not what we call Freudism; it is psychoanalytic method in practice. In addition to this, Freud proposed a theory of personality, a theory of human nature. And it is here that Freudism emerges. Here, in his conception of the human person, Freud sets forth what he takes to be the implications of his clinical work. It is his account of what human life can be and should be. And the picture is not a pretty one. But we forget—an injustice to Freud and a worse injustice to ourselves—that Freud could not escape the influence of three centuries of subjectivism during which the intellect was systematically separated and even divorced from emotion and sensibility to produce the disoriented mind of contemporary man. There can be no doubt that Freud wished to diminish human suffering and despair and to enlarge the human capacity for love. And he frequently confirms the insights of poets and prophets and saints and brings his own kind of evidence to the defense of the truly civilizing functions of human life—art, morality, religion—the components of the spiritual life. And yet, such are the implications of his teaching that he must finally speak of the very same civilizing value—with contempt!

Freud's theory of man is neither materialistic nor behavioristic, since it recognizes the reality of consciousness, but it is impenitently deterministic. What happens, happens inexorably by virtue of prior causes. And by cause Freud means material or efficient cause, cause as understood by experimental science, which means that a cause is always something that drives from behind but never a motive that draws from in front. Emotional affinity of every kind reduces ultimately to inhibited sexual impulse. The attachment of the child for his father and the adult for his God (or better, old child, since the word adult is a misnomer in Freudism) are both derived from sexuality or from *some* primitive impulse or source of energy which *drives* all things. On this particular point, only verbal differences separate Freud from other and later depth psychologists. To call this primitive force compensation with Adler or the will to autonomy with Rank or the need for security with Horney or, with Jung, to give it many non-sexual names, is to leave the fundamental driving primal energy at the root of human activity bearing, all the while, a striking resemblance to the old libido in everything except name.

All activity is explained by irrational impulse and its results are not at all what they seem, namely, good in themselves. They are good for something else, namely, the adjustment of the organism in a hostile world. Intrinsic goods are not really good in themselves. They are merely instruments by which we come to terms with what would, otherwise, be neurosis-producing inhibitions. The theory gives an excellent account of the neurotic or what Plato called the inverted personality, but it is not even a credible account of the normal or healthy personality. Consequently, one of Freud's most perceptive and sympathetic critics makes the following observation:

Psycho-analytical investigation does not explain the philosophical aspect of philosophy, the artistic aspect of art, the scientific aspect of science, the moral aspect of morality, or the religious aspect of religion. The specific nature of the spiritual values eludes the instrument of investigation which Freud's genius has created. Psycho-analysis leaves the fundamental problems of the human soul where it found them.³

Remembering Freud's practical aim of liberating man from servility to his fears, one might ask if such freedom could possibly be achieved on this view of human nature. Such freedom is presumably, for Freud, freedom from the artificial restraints and conventional taboos which are man-made and especially from those which, at least allegedly, are divinely ordained. But moral laws can be broken. If they could not be broken, they would not be moral laws. There is no sense in talking about a moral obligation unless I can repudiate it. And to be moral is to be free, since if I am not free it cannot be demanded of me that I be moral. However, in place of the great traditional laws of morality and religion—all breakable—Freud substitutes the laws of psychic energy, which cannot be broken! This is a singular way of presenting man with his freedom.

I wish to urge against this that neurotics are pushed from behind—healthy minds never. The neurotic shrinks away from reality or retires passively before its challenge so that his life loses the name of action and becomes a performance, directed by he knows not what. The healthy mind *aspires* to reality, actual or ideal, and knows the object of his aspiration. There is all the difference here that exists between opposites and the psychologist, generally speaking, has yet

³R. Dalbiez, *Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud*, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1941, Vol. II, pp. 325-326.

to see the difference. At least he has yet to see the full implications of the difference—and to miss the implications is, in this case, virtually to miss the difference.⁴

By way of illustration, consider Freud's description of religion in *The Future of An Illusion*. He describes it thus:

Religion consists of certain dogmas, assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality, which tell one something one has not discovered for oneself and which claim that one should give them credence.⁵

This is not even a good definition of primitive religion, not to mention Christianity or other fully developed religions. However, Freud goes on to say that if we ask for the credentials of these dogmas we get three answers: they deserve to be believed (1) because our ancestors believed them; (2) because we possess proofs which have been handed down to us from this same period of antiquity; (3) because it is forbidden to raise the question of their authenticity at all. It is uncharitable to criticize mere confusion especially when it is probably impenetrable anyway. There is no subject which has been debated more vigorously and defended more subtly and skillfully than Catholic theology, natural and revealed. And if Freud was not talking about that—well, he should have been talking about it on pain of total irrelevance, the implication of which is total incompetence.

There remains the matter of 'illusion'. By "illusion" Freud means a belief which is not necessarily false but which is illusory in the sense that the element of wish-fulfilment is the prominent factor in its motivation. In the first place, wishing that God existed has no more to do with His existence than wishing that he did not. Freud hoped aggressively that God does not exist. That tells us a good deal about Freud; nothing whatever about God. But, in the second place, does it really make much sense to say that a man becomes a Christian because he is motivated by wish-fulfilment? Christianity does not allow me to believe whatever flatters and consoles me, whatever is congenial to my whim or soothing to my pride. It makes demands upon my intellect, my imagination, my will and my faith which I find at times oppressive and, indeed, unbearable. It tells me

⁴Gordon Allport is a notable exception. See his *Personality*, Ch. VII. The classical source for the suggestion made here is Plato. See *Republic*, Bk. IV and the Myth of the *Phaedrus*.

⁵S. Freud, *The Future of An Illusion*, New York, Liveright, 1949, p. 43.

that I may be forgiven, but that I may not be excused. It tells me that I am to hate the sin and love the sinner, whereas my natural disposition is to hate the sinner and love the sin. It tells me that I must love my neighbor as myself, but my neighbor is impossible and I am not altogether sure about myself. It tells me that God in Christ came into history, lived and taught, was defeated and discredited, was rejected and hung upon a Cross, and that he died there in blood and agony—for me! To describe this as an object of wish-fulfilment is to torment language and experience beyond all recognition.

The point I am insisting on is that a man becomes a Christian and remains a Christian for no reason that can be described in the language of drives or impulses from behind. The psychologist, in attempting ultimate assessments of the worth of religious experience and the motives of religious belief, is continually looking in the wrong direction. God is final cause, not material cause. May we conclude then that the answer to the question, What is the relation of psychology to religion, is "None"? Not at all. The implication of these remarks has been that psychology, in so far as it tries to become a normative science is attempting things which it is simply not equipped to handle. In fact, a genetic account of anything is incapable of settling anything except a genetic problem—and religion is not a genetic problem. However, in so far as psychology is a descriptive science the situation is quite different. Psychology cannot *decide* moral or religious questions any more than geology can. But the descriptive evidence which psychology provides is likely to be far more relevant to moral and religious problems than the evidence of geology ever could be. The positive contribution of depth psychology may be reconsidered, therefore, with respect to its descriptive significance.

I suggested earlier that the moralist is sometimes guilty of the charge that he is out of touch with the common life of man. He is thus guilty when, along with his proper concern for ends and ideals, he exhibits a lack of concern for imperfection, conflict, weakness, frustration—the private agonies and humiliating defeats that the commonest man on earth lives with, sometimes his whole life long. Why is it so difficult to love my neighbor? Surely it is, partly, because I see him only in his moments of confident cheeriness and blatant self-possession or, perhaps, in moments of surliness and general bad humor. I never see his tears or his anguish. I know a fraction of his

waking life but never his dreams or his visions. And so his life to me, and mine to him, is an incredibly simple surface as compared with the tangle of motives hidden within. Now, conflicts that are on the surface are easy to see and are not likely to be neglected. But unhappily, when conflicts come to the surface they represent the end of a process which has been progressing toward the explosive stage for an indefinite period. Conflicts of this kind are psychic cancers; by the time they are noticeable, irreparable damage has been done. And this knowledge, and the hope of doing something about it, we owe to Freud more than to any other man.

The literature of modern psychology would show that this estimate is not extravagant if the indirect as well as the direct influence of Freud is taken into account. However, turning from Freud himself to the general problem of anxiety, I should like, briefly, to draw upon two books by Dr. Rollo May, *The Meaning of Anxiety* and *Man's Search For Himself*, both of which exhibit an unusually sympathetic understanding of the relation between psychology and religion. Dr. May says:

It may seem surprising when I say, on the basis of my clinical practice, as well as that of my psychological and psychiatric colleagues, that the chief problem of people in the middle decade of the twentieth century is *emptiness*. By that I mean not only that many people do not know what they want; they often do not have any clear idea of what they feel.⁶

It is no longer news, of course, that this is an age of anxiety. And if space permitted it would be worth while to examine the contribution of literature and, in particular, the philosophy of existentialism, by way of comparison and contrast. When T. S. Eliot wrote *The Waste Land* and *The Hollow Men* he showed himself to be not a traitor but a prophet. His detractors, and there is a rich field for psychiatric study here, missed the point either for bad aesthetic reasons or for bad moral reasons, which is worse. But Mr. Eliot was calling attention, in one way, to the same problem that Freud had made his own in psychology—lack of awareness, apathy, passivity, the failure, as Paul Tillich says, of “the courage to be.” Thus the most significant intellectual movements of our time converge on the same point and the degree to which they confirm the findings of depth psychology is astonishing.

⁶*Man's Search For Himself*, New York. W. W. Norton and Co., 1953, p. 14.

Whatever may be said of the Christian attitude toward other movements, it is around the problem of anxiety and emptiness, it seems to me, that psychology and Christianity can come together most fruitfully. I want to suggest why this is the case and why it is particularly important for Christians to acknowledge the contributions of psychology and psychiatry in this area and to assess them at something like their proper value. For one must be profoundly disturbed by the tendency, which is very common among people who call themselves Christians, to reject these contributions for the wrong reasons or for no reason at all. This attitude parallels one that, formerly, was so frequently assumed in connection with Freud who was written off as a crazy man who thought everything was sex.

A quotation from Tillich's *The Courage To Be* will illustrate what I wish to say and, at the same time, exhibit the parallelism between psychotherapy and existentialism. Dr. Tillich says:

Existentialism, as it appeared in the 20th century, represents the most vivid and threatening meaning of "existential." In it the whole development comes to a point beyond which it cannot go. It has become a reality in all the countries of the Western world. It is expressed in all the realms of man's spiritual creativity, it penetrates all educated classes. It is not the invention of a Bohemian philosopher or of a neurotic novelist; it is not a morbid play of negativities. Elements of all these have entered it, but it itself is something else. It is the expression of the anxiety of meaninglessness and of the attempt to take this anxiety into the courage to be as oneself.⁷

He continues,

And since it is a symptom of the neurotic character to resist non-being by reducing being, the Existentialist could reply to the frequent reproach that he is neurotic by showing the neurotic defense mechanisms of the anti-Existentialist desire for traditional safety.⁸

With appropriate changes in wording, this could well be said of Freudism and the history of psychotherapy. My point is this: to use Christianity as a defense mechanism is to invert it completely, to make it what Freud said it was—an illusion. Non-Christians take depth psychology seriously because they find in it a way of living with

⁷Paul Tillich, *The Courage To Be*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952, p. 139.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 141.

despair and even of achieving what May calls "a creative consciousness of self." And if Christians find themselves capable of no more than the formula of neurotic reaction, "It had better not be," they will miss the great challenge and the great obligation of the modern world. The world is full of challenges, of course. More than half of it does not know from day to day what it is going to eat. But the means, if not the will, to meet that challenge and others like it are available. Much more than half the world does not know from day to day what it is going to *be*! No Christian, surely, could say that the means of meeting *that* challenge also are not available. But I do not see how it can be met unless Christians increase their sensitivity to the innumerable, subtle, hidden forms of human discontent.

The task of showing why Christianity has a better answer to the problem of anxiety than the psychologist can offer is not to be disposed of in a few lines, but a tentative suggestion can be made. Psychology itself has, I suggest, no ultimate and, therefore, no adequate solution to the problem of anxiety at all. Its function on the descriptive level is invaluable and must not be repudiated by philosophers and theologians. But adequate description, important as it is, is the preliminary to a solution, not a solution. In this connection it is helpful to employ the happy distinction which Dr. May makes between neurotic and normal anxiety.⁹ Neurotic anxiety is, like normal anxiety, a reaction to some threat which seems to endanger an individual's existence as a personality. But it has three characteristics which make it neurotic and clearly abnormal, (1) the reaction is disproportionate to the danger, (2) it involves repression and other forms of psychic conflict and, (3) it can be handled only by various forms of psychic retrenchment or reduction of awareness, such as inhibitions and other defense mechanisms characteristic of mental abnormality. When anxiety is genuinely neurotic and has taken control of behavior, the individual loses the capacity to believe in any value whatever. Unless that capacity can be restored the individual is powerless to accept help from any quarter, religious or non-religious. In such a case, psychological or psychiatric treatment is required and is, fortunately, available.

But such treatment simply restores a capacity to act—it does not specify action. And besides, normal anxiety remains. Not only is normal anxiety not eliminated—its total elimination is highly unde-

⁹*The Meaning of Anxiety*, New York, The Ronald Press Co., 1950, pp. 194 ff.

sirable for the reason that it would involve a ridiculous over-simplification of life to something like the animal or even the vegetable level. Normal anxiety is not disproportionate to the objective threats of existence, does not involve repression, and does not require neurotic defense mechanisms. It can be confronted constructively and relieved by appropriate action. But there's the rub! For *what is appropriate action?* The sane and mature personality is presumably the personality which has been achieved in the light of appropriate action. But what is it that makes a man sane? The psychologist is articulate and even rhapsodic when he talks about the abnormal. He can provide a richness of detail which can only inspire wonder and admiration. But when you ask him to describe *sanity*, his style becomes dull, insipid, thin, and wearisome—a catalogue of the ordinary, the common, the average—and he speaks the platitudinous language of conformity.

Dr. May goes a little beyond this in suggesting that the mark of a developed personality is "a creative consciousness of self," and he says that the highest level of development "is what is meant in such statements as those in the Bible about losing one's life for the sake of the values one believes in."¹⁰ This is uncommonly generous and there is an implication that almost any set of values will do. In any event, what values *ought* one to believe in—whatever 'a value' or 'a set of values' could possibly be. The Communist is willing to lose his life for 'values' he believes in. The Nazi displayed a similar willingness, and something more, indeed, than mere willingness.

Again, Dr. May recommends, with Spinoza in mind, living in the eternal moment. This, he explains, "does not mean living by an absolute dogma, religious or otherwise, or by a moral rule. It means, rather, making one's own decisions in freedom and responsibility, and in self-awareness and in accord with one's own unique character as a person."¹¹ Unfortunately, it is difficult to attach any meaning to this statement. Responsibility to what or to whom? Decisions about what? A man who says, "I am responsible for my own actions" is uttering a trivial truth, like the man who says, "I know my own mind" and, as Chesterton observed, the man who says, "I know my own mind," is saying something about as philosophically profound as "I blow my own nose." And Hitler, we hope, was unique. Dr.

¹⁰*Man's Search For Himself*, pp. 138 ff., 142.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 271-272.

May, it should be added, himself suggests, in the course of his discussion, that the real solutions will have to be provided by philosophy and religion and the sciences of human nature working in concert, rather than by psychology itself.

Well then, if my action is unintelligible, my moral effort is meaningless. On the other hand, if I imagine that I have already arrived, that same moral action is, clearly, unnecessary. Catholic Christianity has never endorsed either of these two mistakes. To put it quite simply, the reason that Christianity offers the best answer to the problems of men is that it offers man rational hope. And in this phrase "rational hope" both words are necessary. A hope that is not rational is an illusion. A rationality that excludes hope is a mere instrument of calculation and not even human. I use the word "rational" in its classical sense as including both the apprehension of the good and the aspiration for and love of the good that is apprehended.

Christianity says that to be sane, a man must perfect his nature, but that he has a natural desire to perfect it just as he has a natural capacity to understand *what it is*. In this sense, man is akin to the divine and is created in the image of God, and essentially good. These things are open to the deliverance of natural reason, when reason is properly understood, and are confirmed by revelation. Man is perfectible, though not yet perfected. The Christian conception of man never idealizes him by making him flawless. This is the existentialism of the doctrine of original sin, the dramatic implications of which are so magnificently set forth by St. Augustine, a man who did understand what reason really is.

The Christian Church provides the means of grace whereby, in freedom, man may become not only biologically human but a *person*—a creature who knows, but who never loses the capacity for love and for wonder; and where the capacity for wonder lives, there is also the capacity for hope. This is a venture—an adventure—which is neither for the plain man nor for the even plainer man who would rid himself of all anxiety. It is a path so challenging and so awesome that we could not travel it at all had not our Lord travelled it before us, so demanding that we flee before its awfulness and could never come back, except that there is One to represent us when we stay away and to welcome us when we return. The Christian should be and can be the most magnificently normal creature under heaven.

And this kind of normality, because it perfects every dimension of human nature, is exciting—even the quest of it is exciting, for we stand on the edge of eternity. "About the whole cosmos," Chesterton says, "there is a tense and secret festivity, like preparations for Guy Fawkes day. Eternity is the eve of something."

SOME LITURGICAL MISTRANSLATIONS

By THOMAS E. DELLA CIOPPA

Lakeland, Florida

THE GLORIA PATRI

This minor doxology originated in Syria in the fourth century, according to Theodore of Mopsuestia, and was used by ascetics to counterbalance the Arian heretics. Antioch, Jerusalem, and Constantinople said and sang it in its Greek translation. The form was the same as the Latin, *Gloria Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto in saecula saeculorum. Amen.* (Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit throughout all ages. Amen.) The Canons of Hippolytus prescribed this form as a doxology of prayers.

However, clergy and people used, now and then, two variations: (1) Glory to God and Father with the Son together with the Holy Spirit, etc., and (2) Glory to God with the Son in the Holy Spirit, etc.

Arius substituted a third form: Glory to the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, etc., but it was rejected because of the meaning attached to it.

Latin Liturgies for many centuries used this formula: *Gloria Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto, sicut erat in principio, et nunc et semper et in saecula saeculorum. Amen.* Now the order of this Latin in logical analysis reads: *Gloria Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto, et nunc et semper et in saecula saeculorum, sicut erat in principio. Amen.* And the correct English rendering is: (1) Glory to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, both now and for ever and ever, as it was in the beginning. Amen. Or, (2) Glory to . . .; as it was in the beginning, so too be it now and always, world without end. Amen. *Sicut* introduces a comparison, "just as" (i.e. without any change).

The deformation of this doxology and the consequent distortion of its original historical purpose must have taken place by a wrong arrangement of the words liturgically, and because of its corrupt Latinity.

The *Gloria Patri* stresses the mystery of the Trinity and not the eternity of God. The English rendering adds *it is* and *shall be*, neither of which means "existing," either explicitly or implicitly; and it omits the important conjunction *et* preceding the adverb *nunc*. (Et . . . et=both . . . and, or, not only . . . but also.)

Translations in languages outside of the English-speaking world are not mistranslations, although here and there they are clumsily literal. It seems to be deplorable that the Church does not discover her multiple errors even after long centuries.

AN ERROR IN THE APOSTLES' CREED

In the article "crucifixus, mortuus et sepultus est" (was crucified, died and was buried), *mortuus est* is the perfect tense of the deponent verb *mori* and cannot be rendered as a passive like the other two verbs. *Mortuus est* is: *he died* and not *was dead*. Theologically and evangelically it was inserted with the specific purpose of affirming that the Master *died*, of His own will, a *real* death and, therefore, was not in a coma before His resurrection, as heretics were insinuating, especially during the centuries in which Christianity had not yet been established or officially recognized.

When, at Nicea, Jesus' deity was officially proclaimed together with the mystery of the Trinity, other heretics were teaching that He could not and did not suffer upon the cross except in appearance. The famous Council then stressed Jesus' passion with another deponent verb in its active voice: *He suffered* (*passus est*). Thus the Passion, Death, and Resurrection of the incarnate Son of God were declared to be the essential and definite factors of man's redemption, and the theological Christology was born.

THE WORD MISSA (MASS)

The offerings of the faithful in ancient times consisted in loaves of bread that were sent and placed upon very wide plates (*patenae*) and in a quantity of wine that was sent and poured in big chalices with two handles each.

These gifts were called *Missa*, neuter plural of *missum*, from the

verb *mittere* (to send), and the term was adopted in place of the Greek words *Liturgy*, *Anaphora*, etc. as soon as Latin became the Church language. Derivatives of *Missa* are missal, Ital. *Messa*, Fr. *Messe*, A. S. *Maesse*, *Moesse*, etc. Later *Maesse*, *Moesse* was used to mean *Mess*, and was eventually changed into *Mass*. (O. F. *Masse*, L. *Massa*, Gr. *Maza*, a barley cake). But *Missa* is also a singular, feminine gender, first declension nominative, meaning *dismissal*. The phrase *missam facere* for the Romans meant *closing* assemblies, audiences, etc.

During the growth and consolidation of the Neo-Latin (Romance) languages the neuter gender was eliminated and became feminine or masculine. This change confused *Missa*—the eucharistic elements of the Christians—with *Missa* at the closing of the eucharistic celebration, which is only and simply *sending out*, dismissing.

Perhaps that is why liturgists and translators are still saying with one accord that *Missa* is obscure in meaning and derivation and can not render the final dismissory formula, *Ite, missa est*, without blundering badly.

Ite, missa est—"Depart, the dismissal is now" (or "Now you are dismissed").

Ite, missa est is not, "Go, the Mass is ended" etc.

All the aforesaid liturgical mistranslations are unfortunately documented in English formularies, but the double meaning of *Missa* is not understood by any of the modern European translators either.

The preceding notes are taken from an unpublished study entitled "The Evolution of Sacrifice." The Rev. Thomas E. della Cioppa, Ph.D., is a clergyman of the Episcopal Church, in the Diocese of Pennsylvania.

BOOK REVIEWS

Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem Griechischen. By Thorleif Boman. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952, pp. 186. DM 9.80.

It has been customary for many years, at least in certain quarters, to contrast sharply the Old Testament mentality with the Greek ways of thinking. The author of this timely study, of course, recognizes that a profound difference exists between Hebraism and Hellenism, but he aims at showing that the philosophical presuppositions of the ancient Hebrews were not antithetical to those of the ancient Greeks. By examining especially the Hebrew uses of the verb *hayah*, "to be," and of the noun *dabhar*, "word," and by comparing them with the various meanings of their well-known Greek equivalents, Boman shows that the familiar contrast "dynamic *versus* static" has been exaggerated and applies to conflicting tendencies within the two cultural groups respectively. Most stimulating and original is the treatment of aesthetics in the Old Testament and among the Greeks. Boman shows that beauty concerns spirituality thrown in bold relief against sensuality. The Greeks perceived it chiefly through the eyes whereas the Hebrews seized it by all their senses. The author pursues his comparison by discussing the respectively Hebrew and Greek understandings of time and space (offering incidentally valuable comments on Cullmann's views), symbolism and instrumentalism, logical thinking and psychological analysis. He concludes that the Hebrew outlook and the Greek mental processes are not mutually exclusive but should on the contrary be held as complementary. One feels, however, that the author has not seriously grappled with the line of separation which appears to stand between Hellenism and Hebraism—namely, the question of theocentric or anthropocentric interpretation of the world and of human existence. It is hoped that this monograph will stimulate other scholars into following the type of research which is here initiated.

SAMUEL L. TERRIEN

Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel. By Albrecht Alt. München und Berlin: C. H. Beck, 1953, pp. xii + 357. DM 26.

Fourteen of the sixteen papers in this collection are reprints of selected articles and monographs published by Professor Alt in various periodicals between 1925 and 1950. All of them have to do with pro-

blems in the history of Israel in the second millennium B.C. It is indeed fortunate that the author finally yielded to pressure by his friends and pupils to bring them together in one volume, thus making them more readily accessible, for every one of them is of enduring value.

The first is "Der Gott der Väter" (1929). Here Alt argues for the one-time existence in Israel of the cults of the God of Abraham, the Fear of Isaac, and the Strong One of Jacob. These three deities were not local gods, tied to some one place, but family or tribal gods, and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were respectively the founders of their cults. In Palestine these gods came to be identified with the numina of certain local sanctuaries, to be later identified with Jahveh, and the names of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were introduced into the local sagas.

In "Die Wallfahrt von Sichem nach Bethel" (1938) Alt holds that the story of Jacob's journey from Shechem to Bethel in Genesis 35:1-7 reflects the relationship existing between these two sanctuaries during the period of the monarchy.

The next two articles, "Die Landnahme der Israeliten in Palästina" (1925) and "Erwägungen über die Landnahme" (1939) deal with the migration of Israel into Palestine. Archaeological evidence is drawn upon to provide a brief outline of political conditions in Canaan before the migration, and the thesis is presented that the movement of the Israelites into the land was for long one of peaceful infiltration. Warfare such as that reflected in the book of Joshua came only in the last century before the rise of the state. In "Josua" (1936) the legends concerning the traditional successor of Moses are scrutinized, and the conclusion reached that Joshua was, historically, a military leader of the same kind, and belonging to the same period as the judges. In "Der System der Stammesgrenzen im Buche Josua" (1927) Alt argues that the account, in Joshua 13ff, of the division of the land among the tribes of Israel reflects the tribal boundaries as they existed just before the rise of the monarchy.

Six articles (1926-50) are devoted to a consideration of the implications of certain archaeological findings for the early history of Israel in Palestine. In "Die Ursprünge des Israelitischen Rechts" (1934) the method of form-criticism is used to show the Canaanite origin of certain of the early laws of Israel and the Jahvist origin of others. "Das Verbot des Diebstahls im Dekalog", hitherto unpublished, maintains that the eighth commandment was originally a prohibition of man-stealing—that is, it was concerned with the freedom of the individual.

"Zur Talionsformel" (1934) argues for the ultimate cultic origin of the *lex talionis* in Exodus 21:23-24. The last article, "Gedanken über das Königtum Jahwes," now appearing for the first time, argues for the premonarchical origin of the concept of Jahveh as king.

This very brief summary of Alt's conclusions conveys nothing of the masterly way in which he marshals his evidence, the wide range of his knowledge, the penetrating character of his thought, and the brilliant, though always restrained, exercise of his imagination. Where one does not assent to his conclusions it is rarely because of any defect in his argument, but on the ground of evidence which has emerged subsequent to the date of the first publication of the article in question. We await with interest the appearance of the second volume, which is to contain papers dealing with historical problems of the first millennium before Christ.

CUTHBERT A. SIMPSON

Die Botschaft Jesu. Eine traditionskritische und exegetische Untersuchung. By Ernst Percy. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1953, pp. x + 324.

This is a book of the calibre more common in the peaceful days of the early 1900's, when it was not necessary to dash off something in a hurry and then turn to the next task, or to consider the arbitrary limitations set by printer's costs. Every relevant question is pursued to its last implication, with ample scholarship and learning, and with an exegetical skill marked by profound good sense. The author is not, apparently, impressed by the theological requirements laid down by continental controversialists, and hence is free to pursue his study with complete impartiality, as a historian and exegete. It is refreshing, for example, to read his study of the work of John the Baptist, and find that he views his message as one of doom, like those of the prophets of old, without any dependence upon either Zoroastrian or Hellenistic patterns—and without being aware of the later Christian interpretation which would be placed upon it. Jesus' message was addressed to the actually poor, and he came as the messenger and herald of the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom was not wholly future, but had begun to manifest itself in Jesus' ministry: he was himself the bearer of the Kingdom, the agent of God, the inaugurator (under God) of the divine reign, which was to be *eine ganz neue Heilsordnung* (p. 223). It is uncertain if or in what sense he looked upon himself as the Messiah—if so, it was probably in a new and different sense from the popular conception of that office, and perhaps his self-identification was

divulged only to the inner circle of disciples. The words in Matt. 11:27=Luke 10:22 may perhaps give us a clue to the deepest level of Jesus' own conception of himself, something far profounder than Messiahship. There is an excellent excursus on the relation of the Transfiguration to the Resurrection appearances, pointing out the deep cleavage between the two as conceived by the evangelists: the popular modern interpretation which makes the former an antedated example of the latter is impossible. The whole volume is one to commend to all students, especially to those who assume that the last word in the interpretation of the New Testament has been uttered not by New Testament scholars but by the systematic theologians!

FREDERICK C. GRANT

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Kings. By James A. Montgomery. Edited by Henry Snyder Gehman. The International Critical Commentary. Scribner, 1951, pp. xlv + 575. \$5.00.

If the magnitude of the task Dr. Montgomery has so bravely undertaken and, with the help of a devoted friend, so nobly completed were in any degree of doubt, striking proof would lie close at hand in an observation that appears on the very first page of the Preface: "In English the last extensive Commentary on Kings is that of G. Rawlinson in 1873." A subject that has remained without comprehensive treatment—at least in the author's own language—for almost eighty years presents a staggering accumulation of material to be digested and evaluated. Dr. Montgomery has written a commentary that sorely needed to be written, and he has written it extremely well. This, the work of Professor Montgomery's old age, passes the test of comparison with the work of his prime, his celebrated *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel* (ICC, 1927).

In his preliminary discussion of the versions, the commentator moves about easily among a multitude of critical works and expresses many a keen estimate. Yet, for all his sharpness, he puts things, here and there, both in this and in other sections, with a pithiness that is not readily intelligible. At the same time, his general attitude towards the versions is abundantly clear, and, while he has much to say about the methods and devices of the translators, he does not permit himself to draw upon the versions, at every turn, as a means of textual improvement.

In the Hebrew historians Dr. Montgomery recognizes a preeminence that springs from their monotheistic convictions. Quoting Güterbock and Götze with apparent approval, he concedes that the Hittites were, in some measure, the equals of the Hebrews in historical narration. There were no other competitors. On the whole, the mighty states of antiquity, despite their power to make history at the expense of the Hebrews, wrote history with a skill sadly inferior to that of the little nation they pushed around. Dr. Montgomery points out that the Sole God in whom the Hebrews believed imparts sense to history.

Dr. Montgomery next turns to an investigation of sources. Of these the books contain a great diversity. The "journals" composed by such officials as the Royal Recorder furnished matter for historical works of a higher order: the Acts of Solomon, the Chronicles of Israel, and the Chronicles of Judah. Dr. Montgomery traces a long list of passages to the "original archives." Certain of these passages are "indirect references," but many are "direct citations." As a basis for I K 6, the "architect's specifications" are more likely than a Temple source. Neither here nor in other places where one would expect it is the sacerdotal touch conspicuous. In Dr. Montgomery's words, "This absence of priestly literary sources is very notable in comparison with such origins in other ancient literatures." Political histories (the final events of David's reign, part of the Davidic Court History; Solomon and Hiram; Jeroboam's secession—to mention but a few members of this class) and individual and collected anecdotes and legends of the prophets (emanating from the centers of organized prophecy) constitute additional types of material.

Dr. Montgomery might have dealt at greater length with the question of editions. Can we be satisfied with the statement that the book was put together, after the fall of Jerusalem, by a Deuteronomistic editor, "a contemporary of Jeremiah"? Can we acquiesce in the dismissal of further work as "later minor revisions"? It is curious that Dr. Montgomery is utterly silent about the substantial grounds for holding that the work passed through two Deuteronomistic editions (c. 600 and c. 550).

The chronology of the two monarchies is a thorny question, but a writer in Dr. Montgomery's position has to hurl himself at the thorns. The data are bewildering. The attempts at interpretation are twice as bewildering. Dr. Montgomery has a competent grasp of the literature and puts us into touch with the various trends in chrono-

logical studies. He cannot be blamed for offering nothing of his own. Prudently, he "foregoes adding to the detailed chronologies presented in commentaries, histories, and the many special monographs." In his List of Regnal Terms and Synchronisms he leans on Begrich. Thiele's significant *The Mysterious Numbers of the Hebrew Kings*, a fresh and exhaustive inquiry into the chronology of the Hebrew kingdoms, was not available during the preparation of Dr. Montgomery's book. Dr. Gehman's chronology, previously printed in *The Westminster Dictionary of the Bible* and *The Westminster Study Edition of the Holy Bible*, is appended to Dr. Montgomery's Introduction.

The notes, both the critico-historical and the linguistic, are a masterpiece of organization and concise communication. The seasoned commentator is happily not equipped with a set of favorite preconceptions. He examines each problem with wide-open detachment and liberality, reviews the solutions of his predecessors, and gives us his own solution, if he has one, without taking refuge in a formula. The theological student and the working clergyman will find the commentary informative. Old Testament specialists will feel that they have, on many a point, all—or nearly all—the material they require for a critical judgment. Whatever his degree of expertness, the reader, as he turns the pages, will become ever more deeply conscious of the intention behind this erudite volume. The author's purpose is to release the imprisoned life of an ancient narrative, and throughout he pursues that aim, not pausing even once to grind a private axe. The commentary is exhaustive and yet not overloaded. Special mention should be made of the painstaking consideration given to archaeological questions. Moreover, the commentary is, for a commentary, remarkably readable: the author has an unsophisticated curiosity about the things people do and say, and he often helps us to grasp the motives, interests, and characters of human beings. Dr. Montgomery is a humanist in a sense in which we should all like to be humanists —*is*, the reviewer insists, not *was*, for the late James Alan Montgomery is still a companion and a guide to many of us.

WALTER C. KLEIN

Daily Life of the Early Christians. By J. G. Davies. Little, Brown, pp. xvi + 268. \$3.50.

Mr. Davies, priest, scholar, and actor, has produced a fascinating book. He has read his authorities, and has exercised his imagination on the social, domestic, and personal life of the characters he has chosen. He has breathed into them the breath of life. There has been too little of this in modern scholarly writing on church history; and when it has been attempted by gifted amateurs or professional novelists, the results have often been unhappy and misleading. The work of Mr. Davies is moving, entertaining, and fully documented.

The title "Early Christians" is a little misleading, since the six characters chosen range from 200 to 500 A.D., a period during which the "earliness" of the Christians was working off. They are unusual personalities. From the dramatic point of view, he is apt to crowd rather a lot of material into single episodes; but we would not like to miss any of it. Liturgical forms, for instance, gain significance by being associated with human situations.

Clement, the Christian philosopher (who is married and has a young son), has a busy day in Alexandria at the end of the second century. Paul of Samosata, half way through the third, might perhaps have been treated with more sympathy, since his portrait has necessarily to be built up from the strictures of his enemies. Victoria, at the opening of the fourth, is a pattern martyr; her arguments with the magistrate are rather unduly lengthened (from the point of view of dramatic effect) by the incorporation of passages spoken by other martyrs on other occasions. Diogenes the sexton allows our author to give much interesting information on the catacombs, and the life to which they bear witness. John Chrysostom is a great theologian, statesman, and scholar, whose story illuminates the dawn of the Byzantine period. John Cassian is an Italian monastic scholar later in the fifth century.

The imaginative method of letting each character come to life in his own social background has its dangers of course, but it presents history as an affair of flesh and blood. The more cautious analytic procedure of the conventional church historian has its dangers too, because it fails to do so. It is the faith, the conflict, and the 'daily' life which form the substance of history, and that is what Mr. Davies has succeeded in capturing. The general reader will like his work. The more formal scholar cannot help being stimulated by it. An edition of this book with illustrations from contemporary archaeology would be an interesting volume.

P. CARRINGTON

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

The Apocrypha in the Authorized Version. With an Int. by R. H. Pfeiffer. Harper, 1953, pp. xxxix + 295. \$2.00.

The text of the Authorized Version is here printed in a pocket-sized volume (6½ by 4½) with a 39-page introduction, in which Dr. Pfeiffer deals briefly with the writing of the books, their relation to the Jewish and Christian canons of Scripture, the attitude toward them, and their use down through history, together with some concluding paragraphs on the Pseudepigrapha. Then follows a capsule literary introduction to each book, and a summary of the contents of each in the manner of the author's *Introduction to the Old Testament* and his *History of New Testament Times with an Introduction to the Apocrypha*.

H. G.

Spiritus et Veritas. Edidit Auseklis (Societas Theologorum Universitatis Latviensis). Eutin, Germany: Ozolins Buchdruckerei, 1953, pp. xiv + 196. Obtainable through Rev. A. Ernstsons, 767 Silver Ave., San Francisco.

This is a *Festschrift* in honor of the seventieth birthday of Karl Kundsinn, prepared by his colleagues in the Faculty of the Latvian Seminary once located at Riga, now in exile at Aseda in Sweden. The contents include articles on Lithuanian mythology (J. Balys), Pico della Mirandola's anthropological views (H. Biezais), Creation and Rebirth: Jas. 1:18 (C.-M. Edsman), The Gospel Narratives of the Supper (M. Goguel), What is Exegesis? (F. C. Grant), The Oldest Form of the Apostolic Decree (W. G. Kümmel), The Biblical View of Culture (A. Lauha), Tolerance and Intolerance in the Religious World (G. Mensching), The Ethics of the Sermon on the Mount

(W. Mosbech), Jesus as Prophet (H. Riesenfeld), The Doctrine of the Other World in Lettish Folk Tradition (K. Straubergs), New Data on the Philoxenian Version (A. Vööbus), and a bibliography of Kundsinn's work (A. Veinbergs).

Die Bibel: Ihre Ueberlieferung in Druck und Schrift. By Oscar Paret. Stuttgart: Priv. Württ. Bibelanstalt, 2d ed., 1950, pp. 84 + 61 pl. with letterpress, total pp. 216. DM 7.80.

This is a first-class popular work, well illustrated, and designed to give the student and the non-expert reader his first view of the manuscript tradition upon which the printed editions of the Bible are based—and then the history of the printed text. Naturally, more attention is paid to German editions than other, but the plates, which include the oldest papyrus fragments of the N. T. and also the Dead Sea scrolls, are invaluable. Scholars will likewise find the book useful—e.g. the list of N. T. papyri and ostraca on pp. 50 ff.

F. C. G.

Aristeas to Philocrates (Letter of Aristeas). Ed. and tr. by Moses Hadas. Harper (pub. for The Dropsie College), 1951, pp. vii + 233. \$4.00.

This is of course the document containing the well-known story of the origin of the Septuagint. Like the other volumes of the series (Jewish Apocryphal Literature) it gives the Greek text and the English translation on facing pages. Dr. Hadas has used the text of Thackeray from Swete's *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* and has supplied his own superlative translation.

In the introduction, Dr. Hadas con-

cludes that the writer is a Jew, thoroughly Hellenized in all but religion, who wrote about 130 B.C. His work is Greek in form as well as language, an ethical treatise representing a latitudinarian Judaism. The subsequent history of the legend of Aristes in Jewish and Christian writing is traced, and a bibliography is added. The text is supplied with critical and explanatory notes. H. G.

The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees. Ed. and tr. by Moses Hadas. Harper (pub. for The Dropsie College), 1953, pp. xii + 248. \$4.00.

Third Maccabees is not in the A. V. Apocrypha, but is found in many but not all manuscripts of the Septuagint. It is an account of events purporting to have happened at the time of Ptolemy IV Philopator (221-204 B.C.); how the king after Raphia determined to see the interior of the Temple and was providentially prevented, how he purposed to avenge himself against the Jews, and how he was transformed by God into a benefactor.

The book was written, according to Dr. Hadas, about 25-24 B.C., and was in the difficult days of the reign of Caligula, setting forth in Greek fashion the Codex Alexandrinus, and in Venetus Graecus. It is an edifying discourse written "intended . . . as a historical romance of an edifying character and perhaps also as masked political criticism."

Fourth Maccabees (on the Sovereignty of Reason) is found in Codex Sinaiticus, supremacy of reason over the passions as illustrated in the martyrdom of Eleazar and of the seven brethren and their mother. The narrative is an elaboration of the account of the same events found in Second Maccabees.

Like the other volumes in the same series, this contains the Greek and English on facing pages.

Dr. Hadas has done a perfectly splendid job of editing and translating. We are profoundly indebted to him as well as to The Dropsie College which is seeing to the publication of this extremely valuable series. H. G.

Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Ed. by Gerhard Friedrich. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, Bd. V. Lfg. 14, 1953. By subsc. DM 4.60.

The new installment of ThWB carries us from the conclusion of Delling's art. on *parthenos* to the beginning of Jeremias's on *pascha*. In between lie several very important articles, esp. Oepke's on *parousia*. The work is still up to its original high standard, and is, in fact, of indispensable importance for all N. T. scholars and students.

On I Cor. 7:34-38 (p. 835) the view that *parthenos*=unmarried daughter is rightly rejected, but the only alternative considered is the strange practice of later ascetics, where men and women lived together, though not as man and wife, in order to be free from economic necessity and to practice other-worldly renunciation of the flesh. The view adopted in the RSV—also in the new French commentary by Jean Héring—is not considered, viz. that the word means betrothed, and that the problem arose from the postponement of marriage in consequence of the eschatological expectation (the immediate coming of the end of the age).

One also questions the theological interpretation of the *parousia* (p. 868): "Though anchored in history, the *parousia* is itself not an event in history, nor any timeless symbol, but is the point at which history yields to the sovereignty of the eternal divine Reign." This is satisfactory, *provided* the reader does not fall into the modern, post-Kantian theological (really philosophical) heresy—i.e. heresy as far as the N. T. is concerned—which views "eternity" as something "beyond history,"

and even makes the Kingdom of God a timeless state. (Cf. C. C. McCown, "In History or Beyond History," *Harvard Theological Review*, July 1945.) The N. T., like the Old, and the whole ancient world as well (with the possible but not certain exception of one or two philosophers), thought of the world to come as still going on, in time, i.e. in endless time. It only mixes up the exegesis of the N. T. unrecognizably to import into it our modern philosophical ideas, and compel the N. T. writers to stand and deliver *our* conceptions. But this is done every day by preachers and systematic theologians!

F. C. G.

Roman Civilization. Selected Readings, edited with an Introduction and Notes. Vol. I. By Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold. Columbia Univ. Press, 1951, pp. xi + 544. \$5.00.

This is the latest volume in the Columbia University "Records of Civilization" series, and is designed as a companion to Botsford and Sihler's *Hellenic Civilization* (1915). Following an excellent introduction on the sources, the first volume deals with the records of Roman and Italian civilization, from the beginnings down through the period of the Republic. The passages chosen for translation and annotation are of first-class importance, including a good many that relate to early Roman religion. Among these valuable religious documents are the following: examples of pre-Julian calendars, Livy's account of the religion of Numa, the hymn of the Arval Brethren, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' account of the Latin festival, the pontiffs, and the vestal virgins, the Twelve Tables, Aulus Gellius' description of the flamens, Cato's formulae for prayers and sacrifices, and many more passages of superlative interest and importance. But the main interest is in the political and social history, the growth of the Roman state,

its political institutions, and above all its vast expansion down to the establishment of the empire. Vol. II will contain material illustrating the period from 27 B.C. to the fourth century, and will contain chapters on law, technical matters, and religions, especially Christianity. The publication of Vol. I, with its magnificent introductions, excellent bibliographies, and illuminating notes, makes us await Vol. II with eager impatience!

F. C. G.

Einführung in die alte Geschichte. By Hermann Bengtson. München: Beck, 1953, 2d ed., rev. and enlarged, pp. viii + 197. Bound, DM 11.

This handbook for students of ancient history is one of the most useful tools available. It covers, briefly, about everything a student beginning serious research into ancient history needs for his daily use: the ancient view of history, the "history of history" (esp. research since the Renaissance), the bases of the scientific exploration of the past (chronology, geography, anthropology), the study of the historical tradition (primary documentary material, the writing of history, saga and popular tradition), archeological remains, epigraphy, papyrology, numismatics, publications—finally a good selected bibliography, properly classified (with references to other bibliographies, e.g. those in the *Cambridge Ancient History*). What the author says of ancient tradition has a bearing upon biblical history as well: "The modern man, who since the invention of printing has not been given to overburdening his memory, is generally inclined to trust the written rather than the spoken word. Things were quite different in the ancient world. There is no reason, accordingly, to distrust the early Roman traditions (before the war with Pyrrhus) on the ground that they were unwritten, and were based upon 'mere' tradition. It

was a serious error of the hyper-critics (E. Pais, E. Kornemann, and others) who adopted this view. Examples from the settled peasantry of Scandinavia, to which M. P. Nilsson has directed our attention, attest a wholly extraordinary toughness in the survival of historical recollections. In this connection it is not to be overlooked that many a tale passed from grandfather to grandson, i.e. skipping a generation, so that the chain of tradition was thereby shortened. In particular the traditions of the great Roman families preserved a great mass of facts: these were at last proved to be historical only by a process of systematic investigation and after they had been regarded for a long time as mere anecdotes" (p. 107).

F. C. G.

Der Gottesdienst im Neuen Testament.

By Gerhard Delling. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1952, pp. 174. DM 9.80.

This is an extremely well documented study of early Christian worship. The author undertakes to reconstruct, from the scanty traces that survive in the New Testament, a picture of the primitive church at worship. It is a question, of course, if the data are adequate: e.g. the material in Paul's epistles (Delling thinks the greetings with which the epistles open are derived from the cultus) or in the Apocalypse of John (Delling thinks the earthly cultus was assumed to parallel the heavenly, and that therefore one can argue backwards and reconstruct the worship of the Asiatic churches in the author's time—though to argue that the Christians wore white garments at worship is going too far). But he seems to assume that the "free", not to say corybantic, worship reflected in I Corinthians was more or less typical of the Gentile

churches, and that speaking with tongues was derived from the Palestinian churches (i.e. from Pentecost, as described in Acts 2). This of course inverts the usual view, which makes the Lucan account of Pentecost a modified reflection of Gentile Christian phenomena, and it also seems to run counter to all probability. Would a sober congregation of Christian Jews be likely to break out into glossolalia every Sunday? Or would even a sober congregation of Christian Gentiles be likely to do so?—for example those solemn martyr Christians who lived in Rome in the fifties and sixties? He also stresses the eschatological reference and setting of primitive Christian worship, though he takes *Maranatha* to mean "Our Lord has come" rather than the philologically and historically more probable "O Lord, come!" Finally, he minimizes the debt of the primitive church to Judaism and the synagogue worship. But the great question which is left unanswered by all such views as Delling's is this: How could the New Testament writers, Paul for example, or the authors of the Apocalypse and of the homily known as Hebrews, take it for granted that their readers, listening to their words as read aloud in church, would recognize not only the frequent quotations from the Old Testament but also the constant overtones and echoes, the faint allusions and borrowings of words and phrases from the Septuagint? And where else would their readers have heard the Old Testament read if not in either the Greek-speaking Jewish synagogue (in the Western Diaspora) or the Greek-speaking Christian church? A corybantic, almost Dionysiac exhibit of spiritual intoxication, of the kind reflected in Corinth (and nowhere else), will not explain this.

F. C. G.

es
es
in
he
c-
on
it
a-
of
out
uld
ian
ple
ho
es?
ref-
ian
to
nan
ore
he
ive
gue
ich
as
New
or
of
e it
g to
rch,
uent
but
oes.
of
gint?
have
not
wish
ora)
rch?
hibit
l re-
else),